Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 13
pro vyhledávání: '"Tomer Ezra"'
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) ISBN: 9781611977554
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::39f35d8470cbda6617d9dbfe7faeb8a7
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch145
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch145
We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart of our model is a reward function, which maps the agent efforts t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e00b1dd7f9890eb19aec7856c82354ef
Publikováno v:
Web and Internet Economics ISBN: 9783031228315
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7f307eefb0a64bb063c55146aa5d5160
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_14
Publikováno v:
IJCAI
Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
We study the secretary problem in multi-agent environments. In the standard secretary problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decision maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision whether to accept
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7de2b46c8d5ea3c8c560dc0d30da0f81
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/25
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/25
Publikováno v:
EC
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21)
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21)
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents, with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion, where to qualify a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::198c1108f1bd551e32d162bcf49a1528
We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to players with private preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous marginals, in which the added value of any item to a set is either 0 or 1,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4b31bb663e29582c1477093c300fbe6a
http://arxiv.org/abs/2002.10704
http://arxiv.org/abs/2002.10704
Publikováno v:
FOCS
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with m items and two players with subadditive valuations. We show that outperforming the trivial 1/2-approximation requires exponential communication, settling an
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::42d8064ada38d7ee68f976c78706ade9
https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2019.00025
https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2019.00025
Publikováno v:
EC
The endowment effect, coined by Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler, posits that people tend to inflate the value of items they own. This bias has been traditionally studied mainly using experimental methodology. Recently, Babaioff, Dobzinski and Oren (201
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0fcd0f929da75433c5de47858d8b18f7
Publikováno v:
Web and Internet Economics ISBN: 9783030046118
WINE
WINE
We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with poste
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ea12fa77a9cf11e408c68ad3bbf9d8da
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ea236999-99a2-4e45-89fa-2fb5786c82c1
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ea236999-99a2-4e45-89fa-2fb5786c82c1
Publikováno v:
EC
The prophet and secretary problems demonstrate online scenarios involving the optimal stopping theory. In a typical prophet or secretary problem, selection decisions are assumed to be immediate and irrevocable. However, many online settings accommoda
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::115d20e51c005760f5bac0110ebb626a