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pro vyhledávání: '"Tom McClelland"'
Autor:
Tom McClelland
Publikováno v:
Self-Experience ISBN: 019880539X
This chapter argues that a compelling case for the existence of a sense of mineness is yet to be made. It proposes that any such case must overcome four impediments. The first is epistemological and concerns how we could identify this putative featur
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1f20d771771b1c29ac2a84004fc1fe34
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805397.003.0003
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805397.003.0003
Autor:
Paulina Sliwa, Tom McClelland
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The inequitable distribution of domestic and caring labour in different‐sex couples has been a longstanding feminist concern. Some have hoped that having both partners at home during the COVID‐19 pandemic would usher in a new era of equitable wor
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::03e910cf18e4c2e7b208d97c7507ef88
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12929
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12929
Autor:
Tim Bayne, Tom McClelland
Publikováno v:
Phenomenology and Mind, Iss 10 (2017)
From the first-person point of view, seeing a red square is very different from thinking about a red square, hearing an alarm sound is very different from thinking that an alarm is sounding, and smelling freshly-roasted coffee is very different from
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1961aabbe103404eb875cdb077384729
Autor:
Tom McClelland
Publikováno v:
Tom McClelland
Affordances are opportunities for action. An appropriately positioned teapot, for example, might afford the act of gripping. Evidence that we perceive affordances in our environment can be found through first-person reflection on our perceptual pheno
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dacd1e20a4f55f246097308f5eb3893a
Autor:
FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH (AUTHOR)
Publikováno v:
Discover. Nov/Dec2024, Vol. 45 Issue 6, p38-43. 6p. 2 Color Photographs, 4 Cartoon or Caricatures.
Autor:
Marta Jorba, Tom McClelland
Publikováno v:
Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 13:527-527
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ffe8b4da2fdd2b772e3ef57af579e1ea
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00645-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00645-x
Autor:
Pablo Lopez-Silva, Tom McClelland
Thought insertion is the delusion that one's thoughts are not one's own, which causes people to believe that external agents have inserted ideas or thoughts into their minds. More prevalent in schizophrenia, thought insertion has been regarded as one
Autor:
Tom McClelland
To understand Self-Representationalism (SR) you need to understand its family. Self-Representationalism is a branch of the Meta-Representationalist family, and according to theories in this family what distinguishes conscious mental representations f
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::70d2191c36bea03b1e3458b11678b01a
Autor:
Tom McClelland
Our successful engagement with the world is plausibly underwritten by our sensitivity to affordances in our immediate environment. The considerable literature on affordances focuses almost exclusively on affordances for bodily actions such as grippin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d99f4e299a299e01d03881a659329562
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/300227
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/300227
Autor:
Tom McClelland
According to the virtual self theory (VST), selves are merely virtual entities. On this view, our self-representations do not refer to any concrete object and the self is a merely intentional entity. This contemporary version of the ‘no-self’ the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f5c8729afdc54ee29fdcef4eb421a0dc