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pro vyhledávání: '"Tomás Larroucau"'
Autor:
Tomás Larroucau
Publikováno v:
Revista Estudios de Políticas Públicas, Vol 1, Iss 1, Pp 1-23 (2015)
Este estudio tiene como objetivo identificar y cuantificar los factores determinantes de la probabilidad de deserción del sistema universitario chileno. La metodología utilizada considera un modelo econométrico estático de tres ecuaciones que pre
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/97f8d856b78844389fef6ec959d3e490
Publikováno v:
Pensamiento Educativo: Revista de Investigación Educacional Latinoamericana, Vol 52, Iss 1, Pp 95-118 (2015)
Este trabajo analiza el efecto de la incorporación del ranking de notas en la selección de estudiantes para la educación universitaria en Chile, identificando las características del grupo de estudiantes beneficiados y perjudicados con la m
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/6981c52f89f14036a48ae85e33b9cfa2
Publikováno v:
Operations Research. 69:1186-1205
In “Improving the Chilean College Admissions System,” Rios, Larroucau, Parra, and Cominetti describe the design and implementation of a new system to solve the Chilean college admissions problem. The authors develop an algorithm that (i) obtains
Publikováno v:
Current biology : CB. 28(19)
Summary Widespread cooperation is a defining feature of human societies from hunter-gatherer bands to nation states [ 1 , 2 ], but explaining its evolution remains a challenge. Although positive assortment of cooperators is recognized as a basic requ
SUMMARYWidespread cooperation is a defining feature of human societies from hunter-gatherer bands to nation states. But explaining its evolution remains a challenge. While positive assortment – of cooperators with cooperators – is recognized as a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1fef03a28b5856220e089e13ca69409d
https://doi.org/10.1101/313064
https://doi.org/10.1101/313064
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study an extension of the classical college admission problem where applicants have strict preferences but careers may include ties in their preference lists. We present an algorithm which enables us to find stable assignments without breaking tie