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Diffusion mechanism design, which investigate how to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues to a multi-agent decision making as possible, is a new research paradigm at the intersection between microeconomics and computer science. In this pap
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.05574
Facility location games provide an abstract model of mechanism design. In such games, a mechanism takes a profile of $n$ single-peaked preferences over an interval as an input and determines the location of a facility on the interval. In this paper,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.12884
Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit, non-wastefulness, a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08809
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given graph based on agents' preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either single-peaked or single-dipped. Our main interest is the existence of deterministic social
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.08914
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is strategy-proof
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1904.12422
In many real-life scenarios, a group of agents needs to agree on a common action, e.g., on the location for a public facility, while there is some consistency between their preferences, e.g., all preferences are derived from a common metric space. Th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.03759
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This paper proposes a new approach to building false-name-proof (FNP) combinatorial auctions from those that are FNP only with single-minded bidders, each of whom requires only one particular bundle. Under this approach, a general bidder is decompose
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______348::c44892cc5b36e1d7ee2bba4627acfbab
https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/388818/
https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/388818/