Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 286
pro vyhledávání: '"Tobias Harks"'
Autor:
Tobias Harks, Veerle Tan-Timmermans
Publikováno v:
Mathematical programming 195(1/2), 35-40 (2022). doi:10.1007/s10107-022-01813-8
Mathematical programming (2022). doi:10.1007/s10107-022-01813-8
Published by Springer, Berlin ; Heidelberg
Published by Springer, Berlin ; Heidelberg
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6cfbe714c17f304f702132d9657ef816
We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum loads, cau
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e81883e9069f417f91bc83f09869cdbb
http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.07435
http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.07435
Autor:
Tobias Harks, Anja Schedel
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Programming.
We study a Stackelberg game with multiple leaders and a continuum of followers that are coupled via congestion effects. The followers’ problem constitutes a nonatomic congestion game, where a population of infinitesimal players is given and each pl
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dff8084d00b72eafbab3fc5c248287b2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01672-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01672-9
Publikováno v:
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics. 33:1932-1996
In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open probl
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ff05a69487cff6b2047b9cffb9bfa0be
https://doi.org/10.1137/18m1173265
https://doi.org/10.1137/18m1173265
Autor:
Tobias Harks, Lukas Graf
Publikováno v:
Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization ISBN: 9783030738785
IPCO
IPCO
Instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE) is a standard game-theoretic concept in dynamic traffic assignment in which individual flow particles myopically select en route currently shortest paths towards their destination. We analyze IDE within the Vic
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6117c39b65a33aee1ad9fc9d09ad4a8f
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73879-2_8
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73879-2_8
We study the problem of distributing a file, initially located at a server, among a set of n nodes. The file is divided into $$m\ge 1$$ m ≥ 1 equally sized packets. After downloading a packet, nodes can upload it to other nodes, possibly to multipl
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::59244e0c632d1df66fa02bde013718e4
Autor:
Lukas Graf, Tobias Harks
We consider flows over time within the deterministic queueing model and study the solution concept of instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE) in which flow particles select at every decision point a currently shortest path. The length of such a path
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::72cb5523b09fbdffa6905dd49660343e
https://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/frontdoor/index/index/docId/88847
https://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/frontdoor/index/index/docId/88847
Autor:
Tobias Harks, Lukas Graf
Publikováno v:
Web and Internet Economics ISBN: 9783030649456
WINE
WINE
We consider flows over time within the deterministic queueing model and study the solution concept of instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE) in which flow particles select at every decision point a currently shortest path. The length of such a path
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5e30a896fd4c8cc7ebffa20b39cbdf3a
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_17
Autor:
Lukas Graf, Tobias Harks
Instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE) is a standard game-theoretic concept in dynamic traffic assignment in which individual flow particles myopically select en route currently shortest paths towards their destination. We analyze IDE within the Vic
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::faa22cb05fe1c250884223dcc240bd34
Publikováno v:
Journal of Scheduling. 25:257-257
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::02d43af81ca33e08672f57769d7212d2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-021-00716-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-021-00716-4