Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 21
pro vyhledávání: '"Thomas Rønde"'
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 67(3):1453-1467
Most technology startups are set up for exit through acquisition by large corporations. In choosing when to sell, startups face a trade-off. Early acquisition reduces execution errors, but later acquisition both improves the likelihood of finding a b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::581d461e38269e0c6c0b77e163296c06
https://research.cbs.dk/en/publications/88030a07-bb88-4c2c-8aa9-480a3e07fae4
https://research.cbs.dk/en/publications/88030a07-bb88-4c2c-8aa9-480a3e07fae4
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5065725363f6be0c4343a2e75ed2073e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4010503
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4010503
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 110:91-105
We investigate the effect of mobility of R&D workers on the total patenting activity of their employers. Our study documents how mobile workers affect the patenting activity of the firm they join and the firm they leave. The effect of labor mobility
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b2fc67543cb619e3af4ceeabd1f9ac86
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.12.012
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.12.012
Publikováno v:
Journal of Health Economics
Reference price systems for prescription drugs constitute widely adopted cost containment tools. Under these regimes, patients co-pay a fraction of the difference between a drug's pharmacy retail price and a reference price that is set by the governm
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::640346295e4c304e02dcf91ab2614cc7
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.04.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.04.003
Autor:
Thomas Rønde, Martin Ruckes
Publikováno v:
The Manchester School. 83:475-497
We present a two-period model in which an employee searches for business projects in a changing environment. An employee who discovers a profitable project in period 1 is reluctant to search again in period 2 because the old project may continue to b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6c22f464208ded3c2d76944b093ce46d
https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12075
https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12075
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Industrial Economics. 60:599-608
This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trad
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6a060bc1a5b87ed7f70c671238904c29
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12006
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12006
Publikováno v:
Research Policy
Research Policy, Elsevier, 2015, 44 (2), pp.295-310. ⟨10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.004⟩
Research Policy, Elsevier, 2015, 44 (2), pp.295-310. ⟨10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.004⟩
New entrants to a market tend to be superior to incumbents in originating radical innovations. We provide a new explanation for this phenomenon, based on markets for technology. It applies in industries where successful entrepreneurial firms, or thei
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::420ade800e7b9760a70c65e3b4b7f16f
https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/hal-01738692
https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/hal-01738692
Publikováno v:
Journal of Industrial Economics. 53:53-81
We introduce stochastic R&D in the Hotelling model and show that if the technical risk is sufficiently high, all firms focus on the most valuable market segment. We then endogenize technical risk by allowing firms to choose between a safe and a risky
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b886c98a9d025791d91438b0af7b0c0e
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2005.00245.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2005.00245.x
Autor:
Thomas Rønde
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics Management Strategy. 10:391-417
If trade secrets are weakly protected by law, firms risk losing their valuable information when employees are hired by competitors. It may therefore be optimal to limit the number of employees who share the trade secrets even if it reduces the firm's
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::191b1518fc67dbe44133754166b3921e
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00391.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00391.x
Technology licensing is an important means for companies to extract more value from their intellectual assets. We build a model that helps understand how licensing activity should be organized within large corporations. More specifically, we compare
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::11a3c4efa9f72ece757eacc7029f9d52
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18203.pdf
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18203.pdf