Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 40
pro vyhledávání: '"Theo S. H. Driessen"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 9(2), 343-357. Springer
In the framework of cooperative game theory, Sobolev (Advances in game theory, Izdat., “Minitis”, Vilnius, pp 151–153, 1973) axiomatized the well-known Shapley value by means of consistency property with reference to a specifically chosen reduc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::10c8bcf21636e31e0ce5482ac2c4f8c0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-019-00279-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-019-00279-4
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications. 432:678-698
In this paper, we present firstly a matrix approach, by Moebius transformation, to axiomatize the Harsanyi payoff vectors in the traditional worth system instead of the dividend system. Then by this approach, the Weber set is also characterized as th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f1c3bcb7bfe7b9f2bc092d3e72ec7323
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmaa.2015.06.039
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmaa.2015.06.039
Publikováno v:
Linear algebra and its applications, 438(11), 4279-4295. Elsevier
The paper is devoted to the Shapley value for cooperative games in generalized characteristic function form in which the players of coalitions are supposed to be ordered. An axiomatization of the generalized Shapley value is presented in terms of thr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::599704d5757bb0209b53ebe3ce7684c2
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.laa.2013.01.025
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.laa.2013.01.025
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 224:566-571
This paper contributes to consistency for the additive efficient normalization of semivalues. Motivated from the additive efficient normalization of a semivalue being a B -revision of the Shapley value, we introduce the B -reduced game which is an ex
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e26f0d21f3fd43169f9f6809f7d81620
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.08.018
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.08.018
Autor:
Joosung Lee, Theo S. H. Driessen
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 220:736-743
A new linear value for cooperative transferable utility games is introduced. The recursive definition of the new value for an n-person game involves a sequential process performed at n − 1 stages, applying the value to subgames with a certain size
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::666737f6ed9f297de1f39f360fe620d7
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.02.014
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.02.014
Autor:
Theo S. H. Driessen, Dongshuang Hou
Publikováno v:
J. Appl. Math.
Journal of Applied Mathematics, Vol 2012 (2012)
Journal of applied mathematics, 2012:379848. Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Journal of Applied Mathematics, Vol 2012 (2012)
Journal of applied mathematics, 2012:379848. Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Galdeano et al. introduced the so-called information market game involvingnidentical firms acquiring a new technology owned by an innovator. For this specific cooperative game, the nucleolus is determined through a characterization of the symmetrical
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::05b4d3e7ab81edf5c02899a83fdb7941
https://doi.org/10.1155/2012/379848
https://doi.org/10.1155/2012/379848
Publikováno v:
International Game Theory Review. 12:309-337
The main purpose is to prove the supermodularity (convexity) property of a cooperative game arising from an economical situation. The underlying oligopoly situation is based on a linear inverse demand function as well as linear cost functions for the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::62f2d030857a388c32247f14b3505a63
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002702
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002702
Autor:
Dongshuang Hou, Theo S. H. Driessen
Publikováno v:
International journal of game theory, 39(1-2), 185-189. Springer
For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::866bd087076906a855d4b231a2bd4683
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0216-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0216-z
Autor:
Theo S. H. Driessen, Hao Sun
Publikováno v:
International journal of game theory, 34(2), 241-258. Springer
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of values, each of which allocates to any player some type of marginalistic contribution with respect to any coalition containing the player. For any value of the relevant fa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::13903124dc9c9b72354fd7df3c5e5706
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0014-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0014-9
Autor:
Theo S. H. Driessen
The study of the theory of games was started in Von Neumann (1928), but the development of the theory of games was accelerated after the publication of the classical book'Theory of games and economic behavior'by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As
