Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 23
pro vyhledávání: '"Thayer Morrill"'
Publikováno v:
EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety, Vol 3, Iss 10 (2016)
It is well known in the school assignment literature that it is impossible for a strategyproof mechanism to Pareto improve the assignment made be the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA). However, we show that it is possible for an algorithm to Pareto
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/9e50a0d40a304daf8b4a7619a4898e08
Publikováno v:
Information Systems Research, 32(2), 335-355. INFORMS Inst.for Operations Res.and the Management Sciences
Bichler, M, Hammerl, A, Morrill, T & Waldherr, S 2021, ' How to assign scarce resources without money : Designing information systems that are efficient, truthful, and (pretty) fair ', Information Systems Research, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 335-355 . https://doi.org/10.1287/ISRE.2020.0959
Bichler, M, Hammerl, A, Morrill, T & Waldherr, S 2021, ' How to assign scarce resources without money : Designing information systems that are efficient, truthful, and (pretty) fair ', Information Systems Research, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 335-355 . https://doi.org/10.1287/ISRE.2020.0959
Matching with preferences has great potential to coordinate the efficient allocation of scarce resources in organizations when monetary transfers are not available and thus can provide a powerful design principle for information systems. Unfortunatel
We introduce a generalization of the school choice problem motivated by the following observations: students are assigned to grades within schools, many students have siblings who are applying as well, and school districts commonly guarantee that sib
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::21612eafee7f7b72a61767e6a7fa8af6
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253517
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253517
Autor:
Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 120:246-256
No strategy-proof mechanism Pareto dominates the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism (hereafter DA). However, it is unknown if a mechanism can Pareto dominate DA in equilibrium. We demonstrate a surprising result: a market designer can do
Autor:
Thayer Morrill, Lars Ehlers
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 87:1837-1875
In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools. Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating constraints from different applications, priorities are often modelled as choice functions over sets o
Publikováno v:
Experimental Economics. 22:918-953
This paper introduces a new matching mechanism that is a hybrid of the two most common mechanisms in school choice, the Boston Mechanism (BM) and the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA). BM is the most commonly used mechanism in the field, but it is n
Autor:
Thayer Morrill, Umut Dur
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 108:269-274
Top Trading Cycles was originally developed as an elegant method for finding a competitive equilibrium of Shapley and Scarf's housing market. We extend the definition of a competitive equilibrium to the school assignment problem and show that there r
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 10:187-213
An important but under-explored issue in student assignment procedures is heterogeneity in the level of strategic sophistication among students. Our work provides the first direct measure of which students rank schools following their true preference
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 9:1-27
For procuring from sellers with decreasing returns, there are known efficient dynamic auction formats. In this paper, we design an efficient dynamic procurement auction for the case where goods are homogeneous and bidders have increasing returns. Our
Autor:
Robert G. Hammond, Thayer Morrill
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Psychology. 57:39-55
We study strategic behavior in an “alternating recognition” model of English auctions with competing sellers, which mimics a structure that is common in online marketplaces such as eBay. To relate decision making in our experimental setting to in