Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 47
pro vyhledávání: '"Tao, Biaoshuai"'
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can collaborate in a g
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.08127
We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing fairness p
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.06877
We study cascades in social networks with the independent cascade (IC) model and the Susceptible-Infected-recovered (SIR) model. The well-studied IC model fails to capture the feature of node recovery, and the SIR model is a variant of the IC model w
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.11470
Autor:
Bu, Xiaolin, Tao, Biaoshuai
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an EF$^{+u}_{-v}$ allo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.13634
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this paper, we study
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.18133
We study the efficiency of fair allocations using the well-studied price of fairness concept, which quantitatively measures the worst-case efficiency loss when imposing fairness constraints. Previous works provided partial results on the price of fai
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01516
We consider the fair allocation problem of indivisible items. Most previous work focuses on fairness and/or efficiency among agents given agents' preferences. However, besides the agents, the allocator as the resource owner may also be involved in ma
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.03475
We study the problem of allocating a group of indivisible chores among agents while each chore has a binary marginal. We focus on the fairness criteria of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and investigate the existence of EFX allocations. We show th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2308.12177
We study the problem of allocating divisible resources among $n$ agents, hopefully in a fair and efficient manner. With the presence of strategic agents, additional incentive guarantees are also necessary, and the problem of designing fair and effici
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2308.08903
Autor:
Tao, Biaoshuai, Yang, Mingwei
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among $n$ strategic agents. It is well-known that truthfulness is incompatible with any meaningful fairness notions. We bypass the strong negative result by considering the concept of incent
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.15920