Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 118
pro vyhledávání: '"Tang, Pingzhong"'
Autor:
Li, Juncheng, Tang, Pingzhong
Proportional dynamics, originated from peer-to-peer file sharing systems, models a decentralized price-learning process in Fisher markets. Previously, items in the dynamics operate independently of one another, and each is assumed to belong to a diff
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.11872
Autor:
Li, Juncheng, Tang, Pingzhong
Linear Fisher market is one of the most fundamental economic models. The market is traditionally examined on the basis of individual's price-taking behavior. However, this assumption breaks in markets such as online advertising and e-commerce, where
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.11869
Autor:
Zhang, Youjia, Tang, Pingzhong
This paper studies a house allocation problem in a networked housing market, where agents can invite others to join the system in order to enrich their options. Top Trading Cycle is a well-known matching mechanism that achieves a set of desirable pro
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.10832
Bayesian persuasion and its derived information design problem has been one of the main research agendas in the economics and computation literature over the past decade. However, when attempting to apply its model and theory, one is often limited by
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.10619
Autor:
Zhang, Youjia, Tang, Pingzhong
This paper studies a mechanism design problem over a network, where agents can only participate by referrals. The Bulow-Klemberer theorem proposes that expanding the number of participants is a more effective approach to increase revenue than modifyi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.08135
Autor:
Zhang, Youjia, Tang, Pingzhong
This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In a query tree issued by the task owner, each agent is rewarded by the owner for contributing to the solution, for instance, s
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.06061
Autor:
Li, Juncheng, Tang, Pingzhong
Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive compatible
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.06107
We consider designing reward schemes that incentivize agents to create high-quality content (e.g., videos, images, text, ideas). The problem is at the center of a real-world application where the goal is to optimize the overall quality of generated c
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.00192
Autor:
Ni, Bonan, Tang, Pingzhong
We consider a variant of the standard Bayesian mechanism, where players evaluate their outcomes and constraints in an ex-ante manner. Such a model captures a major form of modern online advertising where an advertiser is concerned with her/his expect
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2201.11027
Autor:
Mao, Hangyu, Wang, Chao, Hao, Xiaotian, Mao, Yihuan, Lu, Yiming, Wu, Chengjie, Hao, Jianye, Li, Dong, Tang, Pingzhong
The MineRL competition is designed for the development of reinforcement learning and imitation learning algorithms that can efficiently leverage human demonstrations to drastically reduce the number of environment interactions needed to solve the com
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2111.08857