Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 20
pro vyhledávání: '"Tan, Xizhi"'
We provide the first analysis of (deferred acceptance) clock auctions in the learning-augmented framework. These auctions satisfy a unique list of appealing properties, including obvious strategyproofness, transparency, and unconditional winner priva
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.06483
Aiming to overcome some of the limitations of worst-case analysis, the recently proposed framework of "algorithms with predictions" allows algorithms to be augmented with a (possibly erroneous) machine-learned prediction that they can use as a guide.
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.02879
In the metric distortion problem there is a set of candidates $C$ and voters $V$ in the same metric space. The goal is to select a candidate minimizing the social cost: the sum of distances of the selected candidate from all the voters, and the chall
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.07495
We study fair resource allocation with strategic agents. It is well-known that, across multiple fundamental problems in this domain, truthfulness and fairness are incompatible. For example, when allocating indivisible goods, no truthful and determini
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.02040
ITC/USA 2015 Conference Proceedings / The Fifty-First Annual International Telemetering Conference and Technical Exhibition / October 26-29, 2015 / Bally's Hotel & Convention Center, Las Vegas, NV
This paper describes the details of design and c
This paper describes the details of design and c
Externí odkaz:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/596460
http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/handle/10150/596460
http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/handle/10150/596460
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to budget-constrained agents, aiming to provide fairness and efficiency guarantees. Specifically, our goal is to ensure that the resulting allocation is envy-free up to any item (EFx) while minimiz
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.02280
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, \citet{NR99} studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrelated machines aiming to minimize the makespan. They provided a strateg
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.04058
A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a central planner who can enforce how these systems are utilized, the users ca
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.04252
In this work we introduce an alternative model for the design and analysis of strategyproof mechanisms that is motivated by the recent surge of work in "learning-augmented algorithms". Aiming to complement the traditional approach in computer science
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2204.01120
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof budget-feasib
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2107.09239