Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 24
pro vyhledávání: '"Takuo Sugaya"'
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 90:2723-2753
The operation of markets and of politics are in practice deeply intertwined. Political decisions set the rules of the game for market competition and, conversely, market competitors participate in and influence political decisions. We develop an inte
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dbe4ca52fc1b642ca654b66078b9a6d9
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta19775
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta19775
Autor:
Alexander Wolitzky, Takuo Sugaya
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 129:2595-2628
We study the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small probability, each player is a...
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6f494e68726961338ad2f8cb12eefd05
https://doi.org/10.1086/715023
https://doi.org/10.1086/715023
Autor:
Mitsuru Igami, Takuo Sugaya
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 89:1460-1494
Do mergers help or hinder collusion? This article studies the stability of the vitamin cartels in the 1990s and presents a repeated-games approach to quantify “coordinated effects” of a merger. We use data and direct evidence from American courts
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d7b092b7eefc52e3dd63a21b2bf0f8c0
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab052
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab052
Autor:
Takuo Sugaya1 tsugaya@stanford.edu, Yuichi Yamamoto2 yyam@sas.upenn.edu
Publikováno v:
Working Papers (Faculty) - Stanford Graduate School of Business. Apr2019, p1-124. 124p.
Autor:
Alexander Wolitzky, Takuo Sugaya
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. 110:3817-3835
We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3f753e80a5e5aa0822a638763a3885f3
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200068
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200068
Autor:
Yuichiro Kamada, Takuo Sugaya
Publikováno v:
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 135:1725-1797
We construct a dynamic model of election campaigns. In the model, opportunities for candidates to refine/clarify their policy positions are limited and arrive stochastically along the course of the campaign until the predetermined election date. We s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a9b7a7df14ded874eb437ded4108227d
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa010
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa010
Publikováno v:
MIT web domain
We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non‐uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record‐keeping or co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1003ccf8e90c59d73eb4c4fae3b7a77f
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16680
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16680
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bbe0e6ba5891c1843da0769f7235c5f1
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4084130
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4084130
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::315db04beabc9ce50c0e465be9422dde
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4168536
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4168536
Autor:
Takuo Sugaya, Yuichi Yamamoto
We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex post equilibria. In our equilibria, playe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ae24d2ab181c69b5943aeec474757e08
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253494
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253494
