Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 106
pro vyhledávání: '"Tadashi Sekiguchi"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 166:311-323
This paper extends a model of repeated partnerships by Radner et al. (1986) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose their sharing rule. A sharing rule is optimal if the repeated game under the sharing rule has a public strategy equilibrium whose pa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e622a39cf6f08a0bd856676825ff36d7
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.004
Publikováno v:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science ISBN: 9783030030971
PRIMA
PRIMA
We introduce a new fundamental problem called triangular trade, which is a natural extension of the well-studied prisoner’s dilemma for three (or more) players where a player cannot directly punish a seemingly defecting player. More specifically, t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f3f41c108b4bd037d845f42208e165b7
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03098-8_15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03098-8_15
Autor:
Tadashi Sekiguchi
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 44(4):1033-1048
The present paper studies repeated Bertrand oligopoly with multiple markets. The markets are subject to independent, stochastic fluctuations in demands. According to the literature, the demand fluctuations generally hinder collusion, while the multim
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f9292014625874e723c2b2064b1597f9
http://hdl.handle.net/2433/207640
http://hdl.handle.net/2433/207640
Autor:
Tadashi Sekiguchi, Yasuyuki Miyahara
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 148:1929-1952
We study finitely repeated games where players can decide whether to monitor the other playersʼ actions or not every period. Monitoring is assumed to be costless and private. We compare our model with the standard one where the players automatically
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::97c065002b79fd697a595e3b481fd1d8
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.011
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.011
Publikováno v:
Scopus-Elsevier
AAAI
AAAI
This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring or observ
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dae3fecca8a0d3607bc90e32557b7efd
Publikováno v:
Mycoscience. 47:347-350
Genetic analysis of nuclear ribosomal DNA (rDNA) of Lentinula edodes was carried out using rDNA restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs) as genetic markers. Two compatible monokaryotic strains that differed in the endonuclease digestion patt
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8ef0618a2a5695f6057a7804d17631a4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10267-006-0314-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10267-006-0314-8
Autor:
Tadashi Sekiguchi, Rafael Rob
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 37:341-361
We consider a repeated duopoly game where each firm privately chooses its investment in quality, and realized quality is a noisy indicator of the firm’s investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby consumers ‘discipline’ a fir
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::22ffd2d1aad514cc1f028fb235e9dcdc
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00019.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00019.x
Autor:
Tadashi Sekiguchi
Publikováno v:
The Japanese Economic Review. 56:317-331
This paper examines when a finitely repeated game with imperfect monitoring has a unique equilibrium payoff vector. This problem is nontrivial under imperfect monitoring, because uniqueness of equilibrium (outcome) in the stage game does not extend t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::21494b0ebcd45ea1dc2f38522bb927de
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00330.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00330.x
Autor:
Tadashi Sekiguchi
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 40:299-321
We consider finitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, and provide several sufficient conditions for such a game to have an equilibrium whose outcome is different from repetition of Nash equilibria of the stage game. Surprisingly, the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::36a20184168285362f95dab397a7760b
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00008-8
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00008-8
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 40:99-122
We describe the maximum efficient subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for a player in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, as a function of the discount factor. For discount factors above a critical level, every efficient, feasible, individually rational
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e4f0c656cb94eb1f38fa5f9ee836bbea
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0901
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0901