Zobrazeno 1 - 5
of 5
pro vyhledávání: '"Stuart Pernsteiner"'
Publikováno v:
SecDev
This tutorial will provide an introduction to Crux, Galois’ new open source symbolic testing tool. Traditional testing examines only a small set of test vectors, meaning that the assurance it provides is inherently limited. In symbolic testing, we
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::565a759a968de627213569de8d9e26c9
https://doi.org/10.1109/secdev45635.2020.00021
https://doi.org/10.1109/secdev45635.2020.00021
Publikováno v:
CPP
Verifying systems by implementing them in the programming language of a proof assistant (e.g., Gallina for Coq) lets us directly leverage the full power of the proof assistant for verifying the system. But, to execute such an implementation requires
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f1cc4039e9845e2d693dd91b4ca243f6
https://doi.org/10.1145/3167089
https://doi.org/10.1145/3167089
Autor:
Calvin Loncaric, Stuart Pernsteiner, Zachary Tatlock, Michael D. Ernst, Emina Torlak, Xi Wang, Jonathan Jacky
Publikováno v:
Computer Aided Verification ISBN: 9783319415390
CAV (2)
CAV (2)
Formal techniques for guaranteeing software correctness have made tremendous progress in recent decades. However, applying these techniques to real-world safety-critical systems remains challenging in practice. Inspired by goals set out in prior work
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9f3dee51b10ecfc33d1cb3c7e0ada612
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41540-6_2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41540-6_2
Publikováno v:
ASE
Rust is a modern systems language that provides guaranteed memory safety through static analysis. However, Rust includes an escape hatch in the form of "unsafe code," which the compiler assumes to be memory safe and to preserve crucial pointer aliasi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::12d2e089e0b353af31fa916807c4146f
https://doi.org/10.1109/ase.2015.77
https://doi.org/10.1109/ase.2015.77
Autor:
Werner Dietl, Michael D. Ernst, Seungyeop Han, Ravi Bhoraskar, Suzanne Millstein, René Just, Edward XueJun Wu, Karl Koscher, Stuart Pernsteiner, Paulo Barros, Franziska Roesner, Paul Vines
Publikováno v:
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Current app stores distribute some malware to unsuspecting users, even though the app approval process may be costly and time-consuming. High-integrity app stores must provide stronger guarantees that their apps are not malicious. We propose a verifi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ba5ab6dd6b94a8b88c2dee54f18e2040
https://doi.org/10.1145/2660267.2660343
https://doi.org/10.1145/2660267.2660343