Clap: a Semantic-Preserving Optimizing eDSL for Plonkish Proof Systems

Autor: Stronati, Marco, Firsov, Denis, Locascio, Antonio, Livshits, Benjamin

Plonkish is a popular circuit format for developing zero-knowledge proof systems that powers a number of major projects in the blockchain space, responsible for holding billions of dollars and processing millions of transactions per day. These projec

Externí odkaz: http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.12115

Formally Secure Compilation of Unsafe Low-Level Components (Extended Abstract)

Autor: Fachini, Guglielmo, Hritcu, Catalin, Stronati, Marco, Evans, Ana Nora, Laurent, Théo, de Amorim, Arthur Azevedo, Pierce, Benjamin C., Tolmach, Andrew

We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation, providing strong security guarantees for components written in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined behavior. Our criterion goes beyond recent proposals, which protect the trace

Externí odkaz: http://arxiv.org/abs/1710.07308

Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models

Autor: Shokri, Reza, Stronati, Marco, Song, Congzheng, Shmatikov, Vitaly

We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine

Externí odkaz: http://arxiv.org/abs/1610.05820

A Predictive Differentially-Private Mechanism for Mobility Traces

Autor: Chatzikokolakis, Konstantinos, Palamidessi, Catuscia, Stronati, Marco

With the increasing popularity of GPS-enabled hand-held devices, location-based applications and services have access to accurate and real-time location information, raising serious privacy concerns for their millions of users. Trying to address thes

Externí odkaz: http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.4008

Formally Secure Compilation Despite Dynamic Compromise

Autor: Abate, Carmine, Azevedo de Amorim, Arthur, Blanco, Roberto, Evans, Ana Nora, Fachini, Guglielmo, Hritcu, Catalin, Laurent, Théo, Pierce, Benjamin C., Stronati, Marco, Tolmach, Andrew

Publikováno v: 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Oct 2018, Toronto, Canada. pp.1351--1368, ⟨10.1145/3243734.3243745⟩
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

International audience; We propose a new formal criterion for evaluating secure compilation schemes for unsafe languages, expressing end-to-end security guarantees for software components that may become compromised after encountering undefined behav

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::aa3e4c30ef24d96db436671d67487d2b
https://hal.science/hal-01949202