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pro vyhledávání: '"Stern, Johannes"'
Autor:
Stern, Johannes
In this paper we show how to introduce a conditional to Kripke's theory of truth that respects the deduction theorem for the consequence relation associated with the theory. To this effect we develop a novel supervaluational framework, called strong
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.14284
Autor:
Stern, Johannes
The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth to semantics for anti-luck epistemology, that is, to subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.13332
Autor:
Castaldo, Luca, Stern, Johannes
In 'Some Remarks on Extending an Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate' Reinhardt famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory Kripke-Feferman (KF) in analogy to Hilbert's program. Reinhardt suggested to view
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2005.01054
Autor:
Nicolai, Carlo, Stern, Johannes
We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results. Given a fixed-point model $\mathcal{M}$, or an axiomatization $S$ thereof, we find a modal logic $M$ suc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2004.07275
Akademický článek
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Autor:
Stern, Johannes
In this note we show that McGee's {\omega}-inconsistency result can be derived from L\"ob's theorem.
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1704.08283
Autor:
Stern, Johannes
Publikováno v:
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2020 Feb 01. 49(1), 219-219.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/45277725
Autor:
Stern, Johannes
Publikováno v:
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2018 Oct 01. 47(5), 817-850.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44857570
Autor:
Stern, Johannes
Publikováno v:
Inquiry. :1-41