Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 17
pro vyhledávání: '"Stephen Satris"'
Autor:
Stephen Satris
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Investigations. 37:18-36
In this article, I want to do two things. The first is to conduct a sympathetic yet critical review of some of the salient features of the ideas in the notes that have come to us from Wittgenstein's Lectures on Religious Belief. This requires close r
Autor:
Stephen Satris
Publikováno v:
Teaching Ethics. 2:71-76
Autor:
Stephen Satris
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Value Inquiry. 35:13-25
Etude du statut de l'opinion recue en philosophie morale. Verifiant la these de R. M. Hare selon laquelle l'argument de l'opinion recue ne suffit pas a refuter l'utilitarisme, l'A. compare la force probative de l'intuition morale face a la theorie mo
Autor:
Stephen Satris
Publikováno v:
Critical Reviews in Biomedical Engineering. 28:567-570
There is great public concern with the ethics of human cloning. This paper briefly examines some of what I identify as pseudo-problems or myths associated with cloning, and some of the more substantial ethical concerns.
Autor:
Stephen Satris
Publikováno v:
Teaching Ethics. 3:89-91
Autor:
Pamela Saha, Anthony G. Gristina, Jack Lemons, Greg McNeice, Richard J. Friedman, Ben L. Allen, Gilmour L. Wagle, Stephen Satris, Alma U. Daniels
Publikováno v:
Journal of Investigative Surgery. 5:219-226
Autor:
Stephen Satris
Publikováno v:
Journal of Investigative Surgery. 5:167-169
Publikováno v:
Journal of Applied Biomaterials. 1:253-253
Autor:
Stephen Satris
Publikováno v:
Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library ISBN: 9789401080675
The term ‘emotive meaning’ is one that Stevenson, as he himself acknowledges (FV, p. 21), takes over from Ogden and Richards’s account in The Meaning of Meaning. Nevertheless, he considerably alters the notion in order to suit the purpose that
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::145737a0544da0f2cb46da76e2cbce2c
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3507-5_3
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3507-5_3
Autor:
Stephen Satris
Publikováno v:
Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library ISBN: 9789401080675
The main elements of Stevenson’s theory are by now familiar. A psychological distinction between cognition and interest is used to distinguish two different types of disagreement: disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude. These are disti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4d08267dc172c4bc1fd0ff239fee09be
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3507-5_6
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3507-5_6