Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 33
pro vyhledávání: '"Steeve Mongrain"'
Publikováno v:
PLoS ONE, Vol 9, Iss 3, p e92070 (2014)
We model competition between two firms selling identical goods to customers who arrive in the market stochastically. Shoppers choose where to purchase based upon both price and the time cost associated with waiting for service. One seller provides tw
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/18e55b61226b49af840413aa513d0341
Publikováno v:
Economic Inquiry
Economic Inquiry, 2022, 60 (3), pp.1142-1163. ⟨10.1111/ecin.13070⟩
Economic Inquiry, 2022, 60 (3), pp.1142-1163. ⟨10.1111/ecin.13070⟩
We model the allocation of property crime and private protection within cities. We provide a theory where city-specific criminals choose a neighborhood and whether they pay a search cost to compare potential victims, whereas households invest in self
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f87657d75af5e20545f598e87de5f9a6
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03620382
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03620382
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 22:69-97
Firms face many fiscal and labor regulations, but they may evade these legal requirements in several different ways. We develop a model that captures these two types of evasion decisions and unlike existing literature assume firms can evade labor reg
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2021, 23 (1), pp.5-28. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12473⟩
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2021, 23 (1), pp.5-28. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12473⟩
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2021, 23 (1), pp.5-28. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12473⟩
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2021, 23 (1), pp.5-28. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12473⟩
International audience; This paper looks at situations in which public and private protection are complementary, that is, when private protection must be coordinated with public protection to be effective. For example, home alarms deter theft by bein
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5c3b93df22cdbe15f5b8a9870d908dc0
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03391506
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03391506
Autor:
Steeve Mongrain, Tanguy van Ypersele
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The popular view is that governments should crack down on tax avoidance by multinational firms. In this paper, we analyze how anti-profit-shifting policies influence fiscal competition. Governments commit to profit shifting control effort and then se
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economics. 95:1280-1291
This paper characterizes optimal policies in the presence of tax evasion and undocumented workers. In equilibrium, domestic workers may work exclusively in the formal sector or also in the informal sector. Surprisingly, in equilibrium, wages are alwa
Publikováno v:
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 28:186-210
We consider a parole board that learns about inmates' rehabilitation statuses from observing actions in prison. We show why a board would release one inmate, but not otherwise observationally identical inmates with longer sentences: greater parole bo
Autor:
Steeve Mongrain, Joanne Roberts
Publikováno v:
International Review of Law and Economics. 29:8-12
In this paper, we construct a simple model that illustrates conditions under which increased criminal sanctions can lead to increased levels of crime. This finding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining.
Publikováno v:
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique. 42:141-154
We assume that people have beliefs about their abilities, that these generate self-esteem, and that self-esteem is valued intrinsically. Individuals face two choices; one of which strictly dominates the other in a pecuniary sense, but necessarily inv
Autor:
Steeve Mongrain, Philip A. Curry
Publikováno v:
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique. 41:583-594
This paper provides an efficiency explanation for regulation of sex, drugs, and gambling. We propose that these ‘morality laws’ can be explained by considering some activities to impose a negative externality when the activity is observed. Effici