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pro vyhledávání: '"Starkov, Egor"'
Autor:
Smirnov, Aleksei, Starkov, Egor
This paper studies strategic communication in the context of social learning. Product reviews are used by consumers to learn product quality, but in order to write a review, a consumer must be convinced to purchase the item first. When reviewers care
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.05744
This paper shows that the principal can strictly benefit from delegating a decision to an agent whose opinion differs from that of the principal. We consider a "delegated expertise" problem, in which the agent has an advantage in information acquisit
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.13689
Autor:
Starkov, Egor
This paper characterizes informational outcomes in a model of dynamic signaling with vanishing commitment power. It shows that contrary to popular belief, informative equilibria with payoff-relevant signaling can exist without requiring unreasonable
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2007.09568
Autor:
Matveenko, Andrei, Starkov, Egor
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization September 2023 213:172-192
Akademický článek
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Autor:
Smirnov, Aleksei, Starkov, Egor
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some futu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8d28a8442a3a935f4ca72a4e39f6e14a
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206850
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206850