Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 39
pro vyhledávání: '"Sodomka, Eric"'
Autor:
McElfresh, Duncan C, Kroer, Christian, Pupyrev, Sergey, Sodomka, Eric, Sankararaman, Karthik, Chauvin, Zack, Dexter, Neil, Dickerson, John P
Global demand for donated blood far exceeds supply, and unmet need is greatest in low- and middle-income countries; experts suggest that large-scale coordination is necessary to alleviate demand. Using the Facebook Blood Donation tool, we conduct the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2108.04862
Budget-management systems are one of the key components of modern auction markets. Internet advertising platforms typically offer advertisers the possibility to pace the rate at which their budget is depleted, through budget-pacing mechanisms. We foc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09503
In this paper, we provide a transform from an $\varepsilon$-BIC mechanism into an exactly BIC mechanism without any loss of social welfare and with additive and negligible revenue loss. This is the first $\varepsilon$-BIC to BIC transformation that p
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2007.09579
Incentive compatibility (IC) is one of the most fundamental properties of an auction mechanism, including those used for online advertising. Recent methods by Feng et al. and Lahaie et al. show that counterfactual runs of the auction mechanism with d
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.07721
In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility (IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism. Our goal is to 1) compute an estimate for IC regret in an auction, 2) provide a measure of certainty
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1901.06808
Publikováno v:
Operations Research (Forthcoming 2021) and Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 745-746 (2019)
Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design, for example in fair division of items. However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information (typically the valuation of every buyer for every item) and co
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1901.06230
Autor:
Conitzer, Vincent, Kroer, Christian, Panigrahi, Debmalya, Schrijvers, Okke, Sodomka, Eric, Stier-Moses, Nicolas E., Wilkens, Chris
Publikováno v:
Management Science (Forthcoming, 2021) and Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 587 (2019)
Mature internet advertising platforms offer high-level campaign management tools to help advertisers run their campaigns, often abstracting away the intricacies of how each ad is placed and focusing on aggregate metrics of interest to advertisers. On
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1811.07166
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2016.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. "with Eric Sodomka and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses"--Page 6 [Below title of Chapter 1].
Includes bibliographical referenc
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. "with Eric Sodomka and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses"--Page 6 [Below title of Chapter 1].
Includes bibliographical referenc
Externí odkaz:
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107319
Publikováno v:
Operations Research, Forthcoming, 2021
Budgets play a significant role in real-world sequential auction markets such as those implemented by internet companies. To maximize the value provided to auction participants, spending is smoothed across auctions so budgets are used for the best op
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.07151
Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the uncertain outcome of other auctions: the so-called exposure problem. Given the gap in understanding of general simultaneous auction g
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.4915