Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 2 081
pro vyhledávání: '"Side-Channel analysis"'
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2024, Iss 3 (2024)
Profiling side-channel analysis, recognized for its robust attack performance in worst-case scenarios, necessitates adversaries to have a cloned device for profiling measurements and secret information for data labeling. On the other hand, nonprofili
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/83347d8d22a848b7bc5140d729e7053f
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
A common assumption in side-channel analysis is that the attacker knows the cryptographic algorithm implementation of the victim. However, many labsetting studies implicitly extend this assumption to the knowledge of the source code, by inserting tri
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/c8f04ce7f81746d7a49e74dd211db1a5
Autor:
John Gaspoz, Siemen Dhooghe
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
Masking is a sound countermeasure to protect against differential power analysis. Since the work by Balasch et al. in ASIACRYPT 2012, inner product masking has been explored as an alternative to the well known Boolean masking. In CARDIS 2017, Poussie
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/6e52ca325aa648eeb2ea049f66d5fb33
Publikováno v:
Scientific Reports, Vol 14, Iss 1, Pp 1-13 (2024)
Abstract Hardware Trojans (HTs) are hidden threats embedded in the circuitry of integrated circuits (ICs), enabling unauthorized access, data theft, operational disruptions, or even physical harm. Detecting Hardware Trojans (HTD) is paramount for ens
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/57444429652d433f99c100ec3d8fe2e8
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2024, Iss 4 (2024)
In recent research studies, an observable dependency has been found between the static power consumption of a Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS) chip and its internally stored and processed data. For the most part, these studies have focu
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/ab851c8e9fff4d14a96ee345ab77bdf8
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2024, Iss 4 (2024)
Masking has become one of the most effective approaches for securing hardware designs against side-channel attacks. Regardless of the effort put into correctly implementing masking schemes on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), leakage can be une
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/2dc172c0e80d4e5289f4546a8b4396cd
Autor:
Emre Karabulut, Aydin Aysu
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2024, Iss 4 (2024)
Floating-point arithmetic is a cornerstone in a wide array of computational domains, and it recently became a building block for the FALCON post-quantum digital signature algorithm. As a consequence, the side-channel security of these operations beca
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/8454f1b4afff45758a5db10ce78363b8
Autor:
Nicolai Müller, Amir Moradi
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2024, Iss 4 (2024)
Masking has become a widely applied and heavily researched method to protect cryptographic implementations against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. The success of masking is primarily attributed to its strong theoretical foundation enabling it to
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4d4dfc172ee940dd939d2208d9927753
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2024, Iss 4 (2024)
Physical security is an important aspect of devices for which an adversary can manipulate the physical execution environment. Recently, more and more attention has been directed towards a security model that combines the capabilities of passive and a
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/ae7eaca3ec8a4f929d2882c7b3951b93
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2024, Iss 4 (2024)
In side-channel analysis of public-key algorithms, we usually classify operations based on the differences in power traces produced by different basic operations (such as modular square or modular multiplication) to recover secret information like pr
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/730692a7ead94d89bb7d89f05ed9e2d5