Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 12 805
pro vyhledávání: '"Side channel"'
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2024, Iss 3 (2024)
Profiling side-channel analysis, recognized for its robust attack performance in worst-case scenarios, necessitates adversaries to have a cloned device for profiling measurements and secret information for data labeling. On the other hand, nonprofili
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/83347d8d22a848b7bc5140d729e7053f
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
In recent years, formal verification has emerged as a crucial method for assessing security against Side-Channel attacks of masked implementations, owing to its remarkable versatility and high degree of automation. However, formal verification still
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/dc03c25ce8c6488ca38526b5e4379d47
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
Previous studies on deep-learning-based side-channel attacks (DL-SCAs) have shown that traditional performance evaluation metrics commonly used in DL, like accuracy and F1 score, are not effective in evaluating DL-SCA performance. Therefore, some pre
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/3fe701ace4464e51a3c3e4058369025d
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
Side-Channel Attacks target the recovery of key material in cryptographic implementations by measuring physical quantities such as power consumption during the execution of a program. Simple Power Attacks consist in deducing secret information from a
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/a91d15238a404550b30c3329a3f8cbbb
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
A common assumption in side-channel analysis is that the attacker knows the cryptographic algorithm implementation of the victim. However, many labsetting studies implicitly extend this assumption to the knowledge of the source code, by inserting tri
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/c8f04ce7f81746d7a49e74dd211db1a5
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
Classic McEliece is one of the three code-based candidates in the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process in the Key Encapsulation Mechanism category. As such, its decapsulation algorithm is used to recover the sess
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/d14d03b0b71b4e1a8499f46308d66b62
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
In recent years, the limits of electromagnetic side-channel attacks have been significantly expanded. However, while there is a growing literature on increasing attack distance or performance, the discovery of new phenomenons about compromising elect
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/fd7ba410d07c4f8db4e3b9d6d9200f19
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
Model stealing attacks on AI/ML devices undermine intellectual property rights, compromise the competitive advantage of the original model developers, and potentially expose sensitive data embedded in the model’s behavior to unauthorized parties. W
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/76de17c8c213458da972f02b861aa2d5
Autor:
John Gaspoz, Siemen Dhooghe
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
Masking is a sound countermeasure to protect against differential power analysis. Since the work by Balasch et al. in ASIACRYPT 2012, inner product masking has been explored as an alternative to the well known Boolean masking. In CARDIS 2017, Poussie
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/6e52ca325aa648eeb2ea049f66d5fb33
Autor:
Haiyue Dong, Qian Guo
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2025, Iss 1 (2024)
In this paper, we introduce OT-PCA, a novel approach for conducting Plaintext-Checking (PC) oracle based side-channel attacks, specifically designed for Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC). By calling the publicly accessible HQC decoder, we build offline temp
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/42e61eb45cd741a8a17c22042d3748cb