Zobrazeno 1 - 9
of 9
pro vyhledávání: '"Shubhro Sarkar"'
Autor:
Shivangi Chandel, Shubhro Sarkar
Publikováno v:
Economic Modelling. 120:106187
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::14f2521fd573ba3f26779786b4375357
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2022.106187
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2022.106187
Autor:
Shubhro Sarkar, Ritika Jain
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Policy Reform. 22:384-398
Using panel data estimation for limited dependent variables and sample selection models, we identify political, industry specific, firm specific and macroeconomic variables which influenced the dec...
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::36f6abb03af5bb4cb1776758e6ab4e85
https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2018.1457961
https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2018.1457961
Autor:
Shubhro Sarkar, Ritika Jain
Publikováno v:
Public Finance Review. 46:821-849
We build a two-stage game theoretic model to capture the effect of ideologies of parties in a coalition on disinvestment decisions. We focus on three specific aspects of ideology—ideology score of the coalition, ideology dispersion of the coalition
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5c2f1935e8aeb2e00a86c74e05dfd5fe
https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142116681839
https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142116681839
Autor:
Shubhro Sarkar
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 80:1-20
We consider a complete-information multilateral bargaining game in which a single buyer negotiates with two heterogeneous sellers selling perfect complementary units. While bilateral negotiations take place through a sequence of offers and counteroff
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e8ca1d1360603464a01d7f47d8c48257
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.12.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.12.004
Autor:
Shubhro Sarkar, Suchismita Tarafdar
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper, we show that firms might get an additional strategic benefit from using marginal-cost-reducing investments in conjunction with strategic delegation. While both these instruments allow firms to “aggressively” participate in product
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f98b311c96aff3ddcdcc90740d168157
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3430234
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3430234
Autor:
Anthony M. Kwasnica, Shubhro Sarkar
Publikováno v:
Southern Economic Journal. 77:557-584
We examine the voluntary provision of a public project via binary contributions when contributions may be made over multiple periods. In many situations, early contributors are likely to pay a higher cost than those who wait. We show that in such cir
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cda0c7ab82b6c9e61f13e4f4210a888d
https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2011.77.3.557
https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2011.77.3.557
Autor:
Ritika Jain, Shubhro Sarkar
Supplemental Material, PFR681839 for The Impact of Ideology on Disinvestment Decisions of a Coalition: A Game Theoretic Analysis by Ritika Jain, and Shubhro Sarkar in Public Finance Review
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::76b58a96f0b0180f9a17a0b711d98839
Autor:
Shivangi Chandel, Shubhro Sarkar
Using an example we show that the Revenue Equivalence in the Scoring Auctions, as postulated by Che (1993), no longer holds when the suppliers are asymmetric in their costs of production.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::393a690a7da85de19b9ff00e573f3222
http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2014-008.pdf
http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2014-008.pdf
Autor:
Amit Kumar Maurya, Shubhro Sarkar
In a multilateral bargaining problem with one buyer and two heterogeneous sellers owning perfectly complementary units, we find that there exists an equilibrium which leads to inefficient delays when the buyer negotiates with the higher-valuation sel
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::7b38ee21f0b5361aa11518d824f4f107
http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2013-015.pdf
http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2013-015.pdf