Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 190
pro vyhledávání: '"Shmuel Nitzan"'
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 14, Iss 2, p 31 (2023)
This article presents an equivalence theorem in the context of Tullock’s augmented lottery contest with external or internal cost reimbursement. Three alternative modes of reimbursement are studied. The equivalence implies that, even though the aug
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/d05ac024078f4b4db8da3142981bb138
Autor:
Shmuel Nitzan
Collective decision-making is a familiar feature of our social, political, and economic lives. It ranges from the relatively trivial (e.g. the choice of the next family car) to the globally significant (e.g. whether or not a country should go to war)
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 59:467-493
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0f8439cc539c5f9e8f55f8b9d522d977
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01393-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01393-8
Autor:
Tomoya Tajika, Shmuel Nitzan
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision. 92:275-292
Modest difference in individual decisional skills may warrant substantial inequality in power. This claim has been illustrated in Ben Yashar and Nitzan (Economics Letters 174:93–95, 2019), applying the symmetric uncertain dichotomous choice setting
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::54f34908643c1709e75d20d5ce098f40
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09816-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09816-1
Publikováno v:
Journal of Theoretical Politics. 33:225-235
Power is an important basic concept in Political Science and Economics. Applying an extended version of the uncertain dichotomous choice model proposed, the objective of this paper is to clarify the relationship between two different types of power a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3d2d50b2382d07f7d3804141802a7736
https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820984849
https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820984849
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2ed88f6f8ac27d6224309d36cc4b2a4f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4145407
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4145407
Publikováno v:
Group Decision and Negotiation. 29:157-167
Under the unanimity rule, a single voter may alter a decision that is unanimously accepted by all other voters. Under the simple majority rule, the impact of such a voter diminishes. This paper examines the marginal effect of competence on the collec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5ef9b04c66ac6277dd7cb04058a644ff
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09644-3
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09644-3
Autor:
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 53:709-740
We study the fair division of a continuous resource, such as a land-estate or a time-interval, among pre-specified groups of agents, such as families. Each family is given a piece of the resource and this piece is used simultaneously by all family me
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::26b845a8e4e3e750a12fa681a18ae58f
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01210-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01210-9
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Political Economy. 73:102138
A contest designer who maximizes revenue can secure almost the highest valuation of the contested prize. So far, under complete information, this has been shown assuming that the contest is based on a specific contest success function (CSF) and the d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::acda1161b00e40b97b340a5be7680ec0
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102138
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102138
Publikováno v:
International Review of Law and Economics. 69:106042
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::88f2be2e1a88b100e6c5d6875d998e20
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2021.106042
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2021.106042