Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 16
pro vyhledávání: '"Shih Shen Chen"'
Publikováno v:
Engineering Proceedings, Vol 38, Iss 1, p 82 (2023)
We investigated the determinants of absenteeism in the Principles of Microeconomics at a rural state university in Pennsylvania. We apply Poisson statistics and a negative binomial of both Type 1 and 2 models to estimate absenteeism behavior. All cas
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/bf976a1e61b44bcba63a9e31f6821ec8
Publikováno v:
Mathematics, Vol 10, Iss 22, p 4201 (2022)
This paper utilized a three-stage dynamic game to analyze the conflicts of interest between stakeholders caused by firm heterogeneity. We show that the higher the degree of heterogeneity, the higher the sales delegation incentive given. The firm’s
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/0b246a2b33ba4805b34f3b7a4b2214b8
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 13, Iss 3, p 38 (2022)
We construct a dynamic bilateral monopoly game to analyze the bargaining between a foreign manufacturer and a domestic retailer regarding the wholesale price and explain the foreign upstream firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative a
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1beba9fe917e4ca8af00095906911cc2
Publikováno v:
Symmetry, Vol 14, Iss 5, p 959 (2022)
This paper incorporates more general cases with a new class of constantly adjusted concavity demand curves and includes three types of taxes. To verify the output symmetry under various forms of taxation, we simulate both linear and constant elastici
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/0706fae928d24d89840815729589817f
Autor:
Shih-Shen Chen
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Business Studies and Innovation. 2:31-36
In the information age, typically buyers bear costs when they change their shopping habits. Therefore, it is indispensable that manufacturers know these costs during transitioning technology and brand for success in the current information economy. P
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Mathematics; Volume 10; Issue 22; Pages: 4201
This paper utilized a three-stage dynamic game to analyze the conflicts of interest between stakeholders caused by firm heterogeneity. We show that the higher the degree of heterogeneity, the higher the sales delegation incentive given. The firm’s
Publikováno v:
Modern Economy. 10:2110-2119
In this paper, we first show that if the firm’s production leads to environmental damage and the government does not implement any environmental policy by using a two-stage game model, the “excess-entry” theorem holds. We then show that entry c
Publikováno v:
International Review of Economics. 60:375-386
This paper explores how a government officer enacts “optimum” import policy when confronting lobbies on trade policies from both domestic and foreign firms in a transition economy. Two results are found: firstly, if the inducement from the foreig
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economics and Finance. 6
This paper reexamines the well-known results of Hwang and Mai (1990), which employed two linear demand functions of equal quantity intercept to examine total output, welfare and locations of a monopoly firm. By imposing equal slope value to both line