Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 136
pro vyhledávání: '"Shen, Yiheng"'
We address the fundamental problem of selection under uncertainty by modeling it from the perspective of Bayesian persuasion. In our model, a decision maker with imperfect information always selects the option with the highest expected value. We seek
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.11798
In this paper, we study third-degree price discrimination in a model first presented in Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris [2015]. Since such price discrimination might create market segments with vastly different posted prices, we consider regulating the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.06023
Autor:
Karntikoon, Kritkorn, Shen, Yiheng, Gollapudi, Sreenivas, Kollias, Kostas, Schild, Aaron, Sinop, Ali
Solving optimization problems leads to elegant and practical solutions in a wide variety of real-world applications. In many of those real-world applications, some of the information required to specify the relevant optimization problem is noisy, unc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.10640
The previous smart contract code comment (SCC) generation approaches can be divided into two categories: fine-tuning paradigm-based approaches and information retrieval-based approaches. However, for the fine-tuning paradigm-based approaches, the per
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.10388
Based on developer needs and usage scenarios, API (Application Programming Interface) recommendation is the process of assisting developers in finding the required API among numerous candidate APIs. Previous studies mainly modeled API recommendation
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2309.07026
A seller is pricing identical copies of a good to a stream of unit-demand buyers. Each buyer has a value on the good as his private information. The seller only knows the empirical value distribution of the buyer population and chooses the revenue-op
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.07006
We consider the multiwinner election problem where the goal is to choose a committee of $k$ candidates given the voters' utility functions. We allow arbitrary additional constraints on the chosen committee, and the utilities of voters to belong to a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.02868
We consider the participatory budgeting problem where each of $n$ voters specifies additive utilities over $m$ candidate projects with given sizes, and the goal is to choose a subset of projects (i.e., a committee) with total size at most $k$. Partic
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.14468
Autor:
Nazir, Muhammad Azhar, Shen, Yiheng, Hou, Changsheng, Zhang, Chenxin, Wang, Qian, Yoshikawa, Akira, Kawazoe, Yoshiyuki
Publikováno v:
In Computational Materials Science September 2024 244
Motivated by civic problems such as participatory budgeting and multiwinner elections, we consider the problem of public good allocation: Given a set of indivisible projects (or candidates) of different sizes, and voters with different monotone utili
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.12499