Share More: Shared MObility REwards - Summary report

Autor: Frenkel, Amnon, Shiftan, Yoram, Gal-Tzur, Ayelet, Tavory, Sharon Shoshany, Lerner, Ofer, Antoniou, Constantinos, Cantelmo, Guido, Amini, Roja Ezzati, Lima Azevedo, Carlos M., Moraes Monteiro, Mayara, Kamargianni, Maria, Shachar, Fabio Scheinkman, Israel, Dror, Behrisch, Christiane, Schiff, Karen, Shalev, Jonathan, Peretz, Daniel

Publikováno v: Frenkel, A, Shiftan, Y, Gal-Tzur, A, Tavory, S S, Lerner, O, Antoniou, C, Cantelmo, G, Amini, R E, Lima Azevedo, C M, Moraes Monteiro, M, Kamargianni, M, Shachar, F S, Israel, D, Behrisch, C, Schiff, K, Shalev, J & Peretz, D 2021, Share More: Shared MObility REwards-Summary report .

The Share-More project aims to optimize the added value of car-sharing (CS) services and to promote a portfolio of transport services that enable and encourage sustainable urban mobility through the development of the infrastructure for personalized

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1202::5fe1ff3deded9ea2bfb53fb96fa166d2
https://orbit.dtu.dk/en/publications/399fc044-a449-4975-8a38-31cf7adf66d6

Loss Aversion in Repeated Games

Autor: SHALEV, Jonathan

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::58f22a2ca2ce4735fe1968bbf1ef96ae
http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/9802/9802005.pdf

Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution

Autor: Barberà, Salvador, Maschler, Michael B., Shalev, Jonathan

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for a fixed number of periods and

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::e6546f76703a1fe6e31cecd841a2098a
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/154893

Loss aversion equilibrium revised

Autor: SHALEV, Jonathan

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::0e3c675c8e35323159a53afbf75e4cfd
http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/download/attach/workspace/SpacesStore/8ea017d2-2f9b-42a6-89d1-e5053451d3c6/coredp_1997_74.pdf

Efficient symbolic simulation of low level software.

Autor: Arons, Tamarah, Elster, Elad, Ozer, Shlomit, Shalev, Jonathan, Singerman, Eli

Publikováno v: Proceedings of the Conference: Design, Automation & Test in Europe; 3/10/2008, p825-830, 6p