Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 32
pro vyhledávání: '"Shaddin Dughmi"'
In delegation problems, a principal does not have the resources necessary to complete a particular task, so they delegate the task to an untrusted agent whose interests may differ from their own. Given any family of such problems and space of mechani
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0efa883bde2048b7c7d735637c1be70e
http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10382
http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10382
Autor:
Shaddin Dughmi
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 118:609-625
We use computational complexity as a lens to study the design of information structures in games of incomplete information. We focus on one of the simplest instantiations of the information structure design problem: Bayesian zero-sum games, and a pri
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8b0ee2f8b0193a0948bc18eff5234bfa
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.001
Publikováno v:
Web and Internet Economics ISBN: 9783030649456
WINE
WINE
We study infinitely-repeated two-player zero-sum games with one-sided private information and a persistent state. Here, only one of the two players learns the state of the repeated game. We consider two models: either the state is chosen by nature, o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::17bcbae159bde2e50e483a5bc658f42d
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_31
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_31
Publikováno v:
Innovations in Computer Science (ICS)
We consider a dynamic auction model, where bidders sequentially arrive to the market. The values of the bidders for the item for sale are independently drawn from a distribution, but this distribution is unknown to the seller. The seller offers a per
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cebb644a6858960308fef73c0ad5e0be
https://doi.org/10.1145/3037382
https://doi.org/10.1145/3037382
Autor:
Shaddin Dughmi
Publikováno v:
ACM SIGecom Exchanges. 15:2-24
Information structure design , also sometimes known as signaling or persuasion , is concerned with understanding the effects of information on the outcomes of strategic interactions (the descriptive question), and in characterizing and computing the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::317897193aa3ce463cae656169494d65
https://doi.org/10.1145/3055589.3055591
https://doi.org/10.1145/3055589.3055591
Publikováno v:
Web and Internet Economics ISBN: 9783030353889
WINE
WINE
Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms. This paper applies this same methodol
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::694d06714dc060cf1e5039f1d3f24e2d
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_11
Publikováno v:
Journal of the ACM. 63:1-33
We design the first truthful-in-expectation, constant-factor approximation mechanisms for NP -hard cases of the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with nonidentical items and in combinatorial public projects. Our results apply to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::58f5f26facd4dc600373e13b257d3ae2
https://doi.org/10.1145/2908735
https://doi.org/10.1145/2908735
Publikováno v:
ACM SIGecom Exchanges. 14:2-40
In the sixteen years since the inception of EC as the flagship conference of the SIGecom community, we have learned a lot about the efficiency (or lack thereof) of markets. We have studied markets for school choice, marriage, supply chains, advertisi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a0e2d4c7522613613b7cc85b5593e933
https://doi.org/10.1145/2845926.2845927
https://doi.org/10.1145/2845926.2845927
We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal preferences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. In a positional voting rule, each candidate receives a score from each b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::31c2d8d2c4c88203b17c030d8e054cb3
Publikováno v:
STOC
We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with mu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::00b0f26028b545ebda2c5700513346ac