Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 62
pro vyhledávání: '"Sergio Currarini"'
Autor:
Sergio Currarini, Francesco Feri
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 12, Iss 4, p 95 (2021)
The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm’s private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to in
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/c19c81f4cfe940dfb3a9aa8d34e44700
Publikováno v:
European Economic Review. 155:104443
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5f5c1944567bf8b625bffc517056f39b
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104443
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104443
Publikováno v:
The Economic Journal. 130:2175-2206
We consider a situation in which a decision-maker gathers information from imperfectly informed experts, receiving coarse signals about a uniform state of the world. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e0b6e379eb2ae4c5bcd153f9d6304170
https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa039
https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa039
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4788dda775993dc98201060c3020c338
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4290841
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4290841
Autor:
Sergio Currarini
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::320c5ab9820a6cf83868d41a5e3a4d69
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3986005
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3986005
Autor:
Sergio Currarini, Francesco Feri
Publikováno v:
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I. :520-536
This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on information sharing in oligopoly, and discusses recent contributions that extend the traditional multilateral model to encompass the possibility of bilateral sharing agreements. In the first part of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::97539595ca4fadc68346889b0954fd43
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785363283.00027
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785363283.00027
Autor:
Marco Marini, Sergio Currarini
Publikováno v:
The Manchester School. 83:253-287
In this paper we review a number of coalitional solution concepts for the analysis of cartel and merger stability in oligopoly. We show that, although so far the industrial organization and the cooperative game theoretic literature have proceeded som
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bd31ed7241f0207a48f971a1864cb030
https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12058
https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12058
Autor:
Sergio Currarini, Marco A. Marini
Publikováno v:
Economics Bulletin. 33(3):1660-1668
In this note we study the centralization vs. decentralization issue for the management of a given collective activity. The aim is to characterize a class of decision rules that guarantees the stability of global cooperation (i.e centralization) again
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::69e47b7cdd41dae4277793db10be9f84
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I3-P155.pdf
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I3-P155.pdf
Biases in meeting opportunities have been recently shown to play a key role for the emergence of homophily in social networks (see Currarini et al., 2009). The aim of this paper is to provide a simple microfoundation of these biases in a model where
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4dee560d146342df2a1c35fa76f670e4
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/137644/1/currarini_matheson_redondo_2016.pdf
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/137644/1/currarini_matheson_redondo_2016.pdf
