Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 26
pro vyhledávání: '"Serge Moresi"'
Autor:
Serge Moresi, Marius Schwartz
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. :102951
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::11dba6ef98813042ff3fe526b7e8e1d8
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102951
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102951
Autor:
Serge Moresi
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider an upstream firm U that supplies a key input to two symmetric downstream firms, A and B, that sell differentiated products. U negotiates bilaterally with A and B over a linear input price, and A and B set output prices. We assume Nash-in-
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9f13d878725a501fc77915671bcd2217
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3541099
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3541099
Autor:
Marius Schwartz, Serge Moresi
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
A vertical merger between a firm and an input supplier to that firm can generate efficiencies by eliminating double marginalization or alleviating other contracting inefficiencies. However, when the supplier also sells to that firm’s rivals, a key
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::17bcdc29c9d91262cb9219138e596795
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3630589
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3630589
Autor:
Serge Moresi, Marius Schwartz
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider differentiated duopolists facing symmetric linear demands and using Cobb-Douglas technologies with two inputs: a monopolized input and a competitively supplied input. Unlike with fixed-proportions technologies, a merger between the input
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fb4157e4a83f666276203480fb4d26aa
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743708
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743708
Autor:
Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This comment responds to the request by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division for public comment on the draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. In this comment, we show that there is an inherent loss of an i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f99eb551a8a4e51c558a8698b5ae6797
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3543774
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3543774
Autor:
Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This article explains the inherent loss of an indirect competitor and reduction in competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We then calculate a measure of the effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b0da47ef9832d324f5c5b36fc2997158
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3761372
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3761372
Autor:
Serge Moresi, Marius Schwartz
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 51:137-161
We consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival. With linear input pricing, at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand—unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship—f
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::59813f37a6d2822d77f6c8a03e31affa
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.12.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.12.005
Autor:
Serge Moresi, Hans Zenger
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 170:136-138
Most quantitative tools for assessing competitive effects of mergers rely heavily on recapture ratios (also known as aggregate diversion ratios). Recapture ratios measure the proportion of customers switching away from a product that is captured by o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::de09f2fb4d9f9a414ddb1ea8810831d0
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.014
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.014
Publikováno v:
Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 9:23-47
On March 20, 2011, wireless provider AT&T announced its intention to merge with T-Mobile USA, a competing wireless provider. This article reviews the economic analysis of this proposed acquisition that we carried out for Sprint and explains why the m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1fd223ddca68c8a8283a7b57faf34677
https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhs035
https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhs035
Autor:
Serge Moresi, Marius Schwartz
We consider an unregulated, vertically integrated input monopolist that supplies to a differentiated downstream rival. With linear input pricing, the integrated firm unambiguously wants to induce expansion by the rivalÑthe opposite incentive from th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::91c3295061fad7daf36611c5c63aa153
http://mariusschwartz.com/Home/documents/MoresiSchwartzVIStrategicIncentives6-15-2015WPlatest.pdf
http://mariusschwartz.com/Home/documents/MoresiSchwartzVIStrategicIncentives6-15-2015WPlatest.pdf
