Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 34
pro vyhledávání: '"Segismundo S. Izquierdo"'
Publikováno v:
SoftwareX, Vol 7, Iss , Pp 226-233 (2018)
EvoDyn-3s generates phase portraits of evolutionary dynamics, as well as data for the analysis of their equilibria. The considered evolutionary dynamics are ordinary differential equations based on adaptive processes taking place in a population of p
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/0fb36ebc2b894d9b82325f0f00560040
Publikováno v:
Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa, Vol 22, Pp 36-54 (2016)
La economía artificial es uno de los métodos o enfoques de investigación para el estudio de sistemas socioeconómicos complejos con mayor crecimiento durante los últimos años. Este artículo presenta una visión crítica sobre sus característic
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/7fbd0e73c4dc4b3e8ced4946bf85cc5c
Publikováno v:
Royal Society Open Science, Vol 5, Iss 2 (2018)
The outbreak of epidemics, the rise of religious radicalization or the motivational influence of fellow students in classrooms are some of the issues that can be described as diffusion processes in heterogeneous groups. Understanding the role that in
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/816bb8ba42f44c22bb716f2d7b7cdf0b
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 2, Iss 3, Pp 355-364 (2011)
The replicator-mutator dynamics is a set of differential equations frequently used in biological and socioeconomic contexts to model evolutionary processes subject to mutation, error or experimentation. The replicator-mutator dynamics generalizes the
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/881d3efeb19446aa83700d5a044ddd63
Autor:
José A. Pascual, José M. Galán, Luis R. Izquierdo, José I. Santos, Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Javier González Tapia
Publikováno v:
Edutec, Iss 29 (2009)
Este trabajo presenta una herramienta didáctica diseñada para facilitar la realización de prácticas participativas con alumnos vía Internet. La herramienta se centra en el aprendizaje de conceptos y problemas propios de las interacciones sociale
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/5022080fac1a420394f25e6ac6dbb1f4
Stability of Strict Equilibria in Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics: Simple Formulas and Applications
Publikováno v:
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
instname
UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
instname
UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
Producción Científica
We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies
We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c82c3c8bb669cf0d4215f605a0bf7906
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7008
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7008
Publikováno v:
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
instname
instname
Explaining cooperative experimental evidence in the Centipede game constitutes a challenge for rational game theory. Traditional analyses of Centipede based on backward induction predict uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, analyses based on learning
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ce49a615d305f0511ab4772c1be7000c
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7112
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7112
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 118:434-462
ABED is free and open-source software for simulating evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We explain how ABED can be used to simulate a wide range of dynamics considered in the literature and many novel dynamics. In doing so, we introduc
Publikováno v:
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
Universidad de Almería
Universidad de Almería
We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being agai
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1134b850f9d23310d4503f1e553e758c
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203
Publikováno v:
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
instname
UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
UVaDOC: Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
Universidad de Valladolid
instname
UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
UVaDOC: Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
Universidad de Valladolid
Producción Científica
We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose
We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::64013041c62f3bbe9ff37e696f45aa28
https://doi.org/10.3982/te3565
https://doi.org/10.3982/te3565