Zobrazeno 1 - 4
of 4
pro vyhledávání: '"Sebastien Lahaie"'
Autor:
Sebastien Lahaie
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 25:695-700
This paper describes an iterative combinatorial auction for single-minded bidders that offers modularity in the choice of price structure, drawing on ideas from kernel methods and the primal-dual paradigm of auction design. In our implementation, the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3cc121f762df465b7309c20b4efb603e
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7876
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7876
Autor:
Sebastien Lahaie
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 24:811-816
We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information from bidders to compute approximate truth-inducing payments. This stands
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7d520a5d343fda38a96be9790d484c2d
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7642
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7642
Autor:
Erik Zawadzki, Sebastien Lahaie
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 29
A scoring rule is a device for eliciting and assessing probabilistic forecasts from an agent. When dealing with continuous outcome spaces, and absent any prior insights into the structure of the agent's beliefs, the rule should allow for a flexible r
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2ab86e9c5c94e7aa7b14c56ec973afe2
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9696
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9696
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the Second International ICST on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA 2011) held in New York, USA, August 22-23, 2011. The 22 revised full papers present
