Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 25
pro vyhledávání: '"Sebastian Gryglewicz"'
Autor:
Sebastian Gryglewicz, Aaron Kolb
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics, 17(2), 539-559. Wiley-Blackwell
We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes vari
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 56(1), 283-312. Cambridge University Press
Despite their claimed advantages, toehold strategies have rarely been adopted in recent corporate takeovers and do not seem to increase acquirer returns. Are toeholds ineffective and becoming obsolete? We show that this is not the case. We find that
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics, 136(3), 718-742. Elsevier
We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyon
Publikováno v:
Management Science, 66(3), 1248-1277. INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Pay–performance sensitivity is a common proxy for the strength of incentives. We show that growth options create a wedge between expected-pay–effort sensitivity, which determines actual incentives, and pay–performance sensitivity, which is the
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics, 142(3), 1038-1067. Elsevier
We develop a model in which a start-up firm issues tokens to finance a digital platform, which creates agency conflicts between platform developers and outsiders. We show that token financing is preferred to equity financing unless the platform expec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4d33d83efa454d965d6afaf29828f1de
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/bde57056-56c0-4aa3-bd5f-fcb325f3f3c1
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/bde57056-56c0-4aa3-bd5f-fcb325f3f3c1
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
A special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) allows sponsors to directly access public capital markets to raise funds to conduct acquisitions. Traditionally, such sponsors would raise capital by first tapping private markets to initiate a venture cap
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study a dynamic moral hazard problem in which a bank originates a pool of loans that it sells to competitive investors via securitization. The bank controls the default risk of the loans by screening at origination and monitoring after origination
Publikováno v:
Review of Financial Studies, 33(1), 309-357. Oxford University Press
We analyze how the costs of smoothly adjusting capital, such as incentive costs, affect investment timing. In our model, the owner of a firm holds a real option to increase a lumpy form of capital and can also smoothly adjust an incremental form of c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::728542189d4826f9124446057dc40dd5
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/95e6d8cc-3d9b-47a1-a964-8bbb639f11db
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/95e6d8cc-3d9b-47a1-a964-8bbb639f11db
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We develop a model in which a startup firm issues tokens to finance a digital platform, which creates agency conflicts between platform developers and outsiders. We show that token financing is generally preferred to equity financing, unless the plat
Publikováno v:
The Review of Financial Studies, 30(1), 162-210. Oxford University Press
We model the financing, cash holdings, and hedging policies of a firm facing financing frictions and subject to permanent and transitory cash flow shocks. The permanent and transitory shocks generate distinct, sometimes opposite, effects on corporate