Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 16
pro vyhledávání: '"Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I."'
Autor:
Landis, Daji, Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I.
We propose a new, more potent attack on decentralized exchanges. This attack leverages absolute commitments, which are commitments that can condition on the strategies made by other agents. This attack allows an adversary to charge monopoly prices by
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.13624
Autor:
Landis, Daji, Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I.
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an agent to depend on the commitments made by the other agents. This change
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.04373
Autor:
Landis, Daji, Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I.
We study an auction with $m$ identical items in a context where $n$ agents can arbitrarily commit to strategies. In general, such commitments non-trivially change the equilibria by inducing a metagame of choosing which strategies to commit to. In thi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.02178
Autor:
Agrawal, Shweta, Saha, Sagnik, Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I., Vanukuri, and Akhil, Vasudevan, Prashant Nalini
In the average-case $k$-SUM problem, given $r$ integers chosen uniformly at random from $\{0,\dots,M-1\}$, the objective is to find a ``solution'' set of $k$ numbers that sum to $0$ modulo $M$. In the dense regime of $M \leq r^k$, where solutions exi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.01787
Autor:
Landis, Daji, Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I.
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts the design of smart contracts, because agents may themselves deploy smart contracts (side contracts). Typically, equilibria of games are analyzed in vitro, under the assumption that players cannot arbi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.08523
We study a scenario where an adjudication task (e.g., the resolution of a binary dispute) is outsourced to a set of agents who are appointed as jurors. This scenario is particularly relevant in a Web3 environment, where no verification of the adjudic
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2201.06597
Autor:
Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I.
Publikováno v:
EC 2022: 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents who deviat
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2107.08748
Publikováno v:
SAGT 2021: 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract can commit
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2107.04393
Autor:
Landis, Daji, Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I.
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts the design of smart contracts caused by the fact that agents may themselves deploy smart contracts. Typically, equilibria of games are analyzed in vitro, under the assumption that players cannot arbitr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::130633879984dc5da979ac4498754a7c
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.04373
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.04373
In the average-case $k$-SUM problem, given $r$ integers chosen uniformly at random from $\{0,\ldots,M-1\}$, the objective is to find a set of $k$ numbers that sum to $0$ modulo $M$ (this set is called a solution). In the related $k$-XOR problem, give
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::72a47760d88f40f95e690ee04b938616
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.01787
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.01787