Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 24
pro vyhledávání: '"Schvartzman, Ariel"'
Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities
A tournament on $n$ agents is a complete oriented graph with the agents as vertices and edges that describe the win-loss outcomes of the $\binom{n}{2}$ matches played between each pair of agents. The winner of a tournament is determined by a tourname
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.10346
Autor:
Aggarwal, Gagan, Badanidiyuru, Ashwinkumar, Balseiro, Santiago R., Bhawalkar, Kshipra, Deng, Yuan, Feng, Zhe, Goel, Gagan, Liaw, Christopher, Lu, Haihao, Mahdian, Mohammad, Mao, Jieming, Mehta, Aranyak, Mirrokni, Vahab, Leme, Renato Paes, Perlroth, Andres, Piliouras, Georgios, Schneider, Jon, Schvartzman, Ariel, Sivan, Balasubramanian, Spendlove, Kelly, Teng, Yifeng, Wang, Di, Zhang, Hanrui, Zhao, Mingfei, Zhu, Wennan, Zuo, Song
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace this autobidding and co
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.07685
A tournament organizer must select one of $n$ possible teams as the winner of a competition after observing all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches between them. The organizer would like to find a tournament rule that simultaneously satisfies the following deside
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.17569
We study the problem of auction design for advertising platforms that face strategic advertisers who are bidding across platforms. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize their total value or conversions while satisfying some constraint(s) across all t
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.02699
Multi-item revenue-optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often offering buyers randomized lotteries of goods. In the standard buy-one model, it is known that optimal mechanisms can yield revenue infinitely higher than that of any "sim
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.14312
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $k$ heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer, whose values are drawn from a known, possibly correlated prior $\mathcal{D}$. It is known that there exist priors $\mathcal{D}$ such that simple
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.13039
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK [2016] chara
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2002.06329
We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which $n$ teams play a round robin tournament and a winner is (possibly randomly) selected based on the outcome of all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches. Prior work defines a tournament rule to be $k$-SNM-$
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1906.03324
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $n$ items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distinct options the buyer may purchase, up to permutations of the items. Ou
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.05231
Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings, distributions exist for which the seller's optimal revenue is infi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1811.12459