Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 47
pro vyhledávání: '"Schlegel, Jan Christoph"'
Autor:
Schlegel, Jan Christoph
We study equilibrium investment into bidding and latency reduction for different sequencing policies. For a batch auction design, we observe that bidders shade bids according to the likelihood that competing bidders land in the current batch. Moreove
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.02055
We study shared sequencing for different chains from an economic angle. We introduce a minimal non-trivial model that captures cross-domain arbitrageurs' behavior and compare the performance of shared sequencing to that of separate sequencing. While
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.02390
Cryptocurrencies come with a variety of tokenomic policies as well as aspirations of desirable monetary characteristics that have been described by proponents as 'sound money' or even 'ultra sound money.' These propositions are typically devoid of ec
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.17025
We design TimeBoost: a practical transaction ordering policy for rollup sequencers that takes into account both transaction timestamps and bids; it works by creating a score from timestamps and bids, and orders transactions based on this score. TimeB
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.02179
We study axiomatic foundations for different classes of constant-function automated market makers (CFMMs). We focus particularly on separability and on different invariance properties under scaling. Our main results are an axiomatic characterization
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.00048
Second-price auctions with deposits are frequently used in blockchain environments. An auction takes place on-chain: bidders deposit an amount that fully covers their bid (but possibly exceeds it) in a smart contract. The deposit is used as insurance
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.16681
Autor:
Combe, Julien, Schlegel, Jan Christoph
Publikováno v:
In Games and Economic Behavior January 2024 143:287-299
Game theory is often used as a tool to analyze decentralized systems and their properties, in particular, blockchains. In this note, we take the opposite view. We argue that blockchains can and should be used to implement economic mechanisms because
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2005.02390
Autor:
Schlegel, Jan Christoph
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a choice prof
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1812.10326
Autor:
Schlegel, Jan Christoph
Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility resul
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1808.07924