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pro vyhledávání: '"Savvateev, Alexey"'
Static and dynamic equilibria in noisy binary choice (Ising) games on complete and random graphs in the annealed approximation are analysed. Two versions, an Ising game with interaction term defined in accordance with the Ising model in statistical p
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2108.00824
Publikováno v:
In Chaos, Solitons and Fractals: the interdisciplinary journal of Nonlinear Science, and Nonequilibrium and Complex Phenomena March 2024 180
Static and dynamic equilibria in noisy binary choice games on graphs are considered. Equations defining static quantal response equilibria (QRE) for binary choice games on graphs with arbitrary topology and noise distribution are written. It is shown
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.09584
The paper provides consistent mathematical framework for seminal Tiebout free-mobility model (1956). Our setting supports continuum of consumers with multidimensional preferences and finite number of strategic public good providers. We accommodate th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1805.11871
Autor:
Savvateev Alexey
Consider a “linear world” populated by several agents. These agents’ locations are identified with optimal variety of a horizontally differentiated local public good. Agents are to be partitioned into several communities (hereafter, groups), an
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::7d08b30a197ab1fb38bf71def2e7a60c
https://eercnetwork.com/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/dd4b34c14c91a6dbe0ac360b93b618b21e87015a.pdf
https://eercnetwork.com/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/dd4b34c14c91a6dbe0ac360b93b618b21e87015a.pdf
Autor:
Savvateev Alexey
The author models the interaction between the “Center”, represented by inspectors, and free riders in local trains (“hares” in the Russian slang). In order to characterize the optimal deterring strategy of the Center, one must look into the n
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::0dc06ff594909fb6e94be8f2f72c2acb
https://eercnetwork.com/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/d89459cb48c1a3f2ad9767db87efe5b1e09949f0.pdf
https://eercnetwork.com/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/d89459cb48c1a3f2ad9767db87efe5b1e09949f0.pdf
Autor:
Savvateev Alexey
A model of corruption in the production process is built which is aimed at studying the problem of choosing the optimal scheme of punishment, taking into account the structure of given production relations, as well as the fixed budget assumption. Sta
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::53e9b104c8efa39c14e1f11a907c12dd
https://eercnetwork.com/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/9ea0cc2a3a7f181d2cc8865c5accff8bbc173d2d.pdf
https://eercnetwork.com/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/9ea0cc2a3a7f181d2cc8865c5accff8bbc173d2d.pdf