Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 61
pro vyhledávání: '"Satish K. Jain"'
Autor:
Shobha Jain, Satish K. Jain
Publikováno v:
International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management. 13:1497-1507
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2f70cbd1548009e8270603cf6ed3ebe4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13198-021-01493-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13198-021-01493-1
Autor:
Satish K. Jain
Publikováno v:
Politics, Ethics and the Self ISBN: 9781003043188
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::af35520e8a9ce6683d1fd96f9981523a
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003043188-8
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003043188-8
Autor:
Satish K. Jain
Publikováno v:
Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice. 19:7-15
This article is concerned with the normative structure underlying the Marxist doctrine and its logical consistency. Two of the most fundamental elements of Marxism are historical materialism and the idea of justice underlying an exploitation-free soc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3efa19596e2c1b0faaefd170ea564926
https://doi.org/10.1177/0976747919842687
https://doi.org/10.1177/0976747919842687
Autor:
Satish K. Jain
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strong consistency of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules. Individuals are assumed to satisfy von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of individual rationality. The main result of the paper shows
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b170a671a9d2580e6db446ccc448edb0
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3718621
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3718621
Autor:
Satish K. Jain
Publikováno v:
Domain Conditions and Social Rationality ISBN: 9789811396717
The class of Pareto-inclusive strict majority rules consists of all Pareto-inclusive p-strict majority rules, where p is greater than or equal to half and less than one. Pareto-inclusive p-strict majority rule, p greater than or equal to half and les
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2c19059cd8bdead6916680085c0bde29
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_8
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_8
Autor:
Satish K. Jain
Publikováno v:
Domain Conditions and Social Rationality ISBN: 9789811396717
This chapter is concerned with the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules. The chapter provides a characterization for an important subclass of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules; and derives maximally sufficient
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4cfea007badf533d9f5514bd6666f53b
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_10
Autor:
Satish K. Jain
Publikováno v:
Domain Conditions and Social Rationality ISBN: 9789811396717
The class of strict majority rules consists of all p-strict majority rules, where p is greater than or equal to half and less than one. p-strict majority rule, p greater than or equal to half and less than one, is defined by: Under p-strict majority
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::add8a1afbdeec0044dfdcff3d9d7de37
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_7
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_7
Autor:
Satish K. Jain
Publikováno v:
Domain Conditions and Social Rationality ISBN: 9789811396717
The method of majority decision is defined by: An alternative x is socially at least as good as another alternative y iff the number of individuals preferring x over y is greater than or equal to the number of individuals preferring y over x. The cha
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a84a207e83e284b969f49eaa415cfd6c
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_3
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_3
Autor:
Satish K. Jain
Publikováno v:
Domain Conditions and Social Rationality ISBN: 9789811396717
A simple game social decision rule is defined by the condition that under it an alternative x is socially preferred to another alternative y iff all individuals belonging to some winning coalition unanimously prefer x to y. This chapter provides a ch
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f72a9fb10a7de91f3cdf70d3dba5cefe
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_9
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_9