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pro vyhledávání: '"Sarah Auster"'
Autor:
Jason Dana, Sarah Auster
Publikováno v:
Deliberate Ignorance ISBN: 9780262363273
Deliberate Ignorance
Deliberate Ignorance
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::49d655d9ab4c2543e36c5881fb2c95a8
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/13757.003.0006
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/13757.003.0006
Autor:
Sarah Auster
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 13:175-204
A buyer makes an offer to a privately informed seller for a good of uncertain quality. Quality determines both the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation and the buyer evaluates each contract according to its worst-case performance over a set o
Autor:
Piero Gottardi, Sarah Auster
We study the competitive equilibria in a market with adverse selection and search frictions. Uninformed buyers post general direct mechanisms and informed sellers choose where to direct their search. We demonstrate that there exists a unique equilibr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fc480f6b974af0540188125fc3a0f454
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217082
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217082
Autor:
Christian Kellner, Sarah Auster
We study the properties of Dutch auctions in an independent private value setting, where bidders face uncertainty over the type distribution of their opponents and evaluate their payoffs by the worst case from a set of probabilistic scenarios. In con
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c608ecdac68da2b9310a5e785510367e
Autor:
Nicola Pavoni, Sarah Auster
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study the delegation problem between an investor and a financial intermediary, who not only has better information about the performance of the different investments but also has superior awareness of the available investment opportunities. The in
Autor:
Latest Thinking, Sarah Auster
Publikováno v:
Latest Thinking.
Autor:
Sarah Auster
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 82:503-521
Received 8 June 2012 Available online 10 September 2013 This paper introduces asymmetric awareness into the classical principal–agent model and discusses the optimal contract between a fully aware principal and an unaware agent. The principal enlar