Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 53
pro vyhledávání: '"Sandro Brusco"'
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 52:446-467
We consider the design of the optimal dynamic policy for a firm subject to moral hazard problems. With respect to the existing literature we enrich the model by introducing durable capital with partial irreversibility, which makes the size of the fir
Autor:
Sandro Brusco, Fausto Panunzi
Publikováno v:
Annals of Finance. 16:501-527
We study the optimal capital budgeting policy of a firm taking into account the choice between internal and external financing. The manager can dedicate effort either to increase short-term profitability, thus generating greater immediate cash-flow,
Autor:
Sandro Brusco, Jaideep Roy
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 100:413-430
We study a dynamic model of elections where many parties may enter or exit political competition. At each election a new political leadership arrives for each party. The leadership cannot choose the party's platform (ideological identities are fixed)
Autor:
Carlo, Stagnaro, Paolo, Manasse, Saravalle, Alberto, Sandro, Brusco, Veronica De Romanis, Natale, D'Amico, Tommaso, Monacelli, Filippo, Taddei, Lorenzo, Codogno, Giampaolo, Galli, Carlo, Amenta
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3657::eaef7cf00e0b406119382681e16c1fa7
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3278980
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3278980
Publikováno v:
Bulletin of Economic Research. 68:16-33
In equipment-intensive sectors – such as water utilities, power generation, and gas – billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. The nature of the investment is often lumpy: at some point a plant has to be replaced and a large investment
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 74:447-469
We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n 2 oce seeking candidates and runo voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the m
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 3:165-193
We consider an auction environment where an object can be sold with usage restrictions that generate benefits to the seller but decrease buyers' valuations. In this environment, sellers such as the FCC have used “contingent re-auctions,” offering
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 69:24-41
In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format that allows for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty regarding scale economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the effi
Publikováno v:
Information Economics and Policy. 21:101-114
We describe and interpret bidding behavior in FCC Auction 73 for the C-block licenses. These licenses were initially offered subject to an open platform restriction, which was highly valued by firms such as Google. Google entered bids until its bids
Autor:
Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe Lopomo
Publikováno v:
Journal of Industrial Economics. 56:113-142
The possibility, even if arbitrarily small, of binding budget constraints in simultaneous ascending bid auctions induces strategic demand reduction and generates significant inefficiencies. Under mild conditions on the distributions of the bidders' v