Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 11
pro vyhledávání: '"Sandra Betton"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Corporate Finance. 75:102243
Publikováno v:
International Review of Financial Analysis. 58:271-287
We perform content analysis on a unique sample of 2074 first-instance published takeover rumors to study how the rationale underlying a publication relates to its credibility and its association with firm returns and rumor accuracy. While most takeov
Autor:
Sandra Betton, B. Espen Eckbo
Publikováno v:
Review of Financial Studies. 13:841-882
We estimate sequentially outcome probabilities and expected payoffs associated with first, second, and final bids in a large sample of tender offer contests. Rival bids arrive quickly and produce large bid jumps. Greater bidder toeholds (prebid owner
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Do pre-offer target stock price runups increase bidder takeover costs? We present model-based tests of this issue assuming runups are caused by signals that inform investors about potential takeover synergies. Rational deal anticipation implies a rel
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics.
The substantial control premium typically observed in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target shares (a toehold) in the market prior to launching a bid. Moreover, auction theory suggests that toehold bidding may yield a compe
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We examine whether pre-bid target stock price runups lower bidder takeover gains and deter short-term toehold purchases in the runup period. A dollar increase in the runup raises the initial oer price by $0.80 (markup pricing). Bidder gains, while de
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Surprisingly, bidders rarely acquire a target stake (toehold) prior to launching control bids, despite paying large takeover premiums. At the same time, toeholds are large when they occur, and toehold bidding is the norm in hostile takeovers. To expl
Autor:
Pablo Moran, Sandra Betton
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper we develop and test a theoretical framework that models the negotiation and timing processes of corporate acquisitions. The acquisition timing is modelled using real options techniques, and the negotiation process between target and bid