Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 64
pro vyhledávání: '"Sander Onderstal"'
Publikováno v:
PLoS ONE, Vol 17, Iss 10 (2022)
We study risk-averse equilibrium bidding in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions where bidders have signalling concerns, i.e., they care about how the auction outcome is interpreted by an outside observer. We find that when the winner’s
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/b32d3163a36c41078ba927ed95ac45ce
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4abee7ae7e3d839f9b6f66e69df42d2f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4458525
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4458525
Publikováno v:
Review of Industrial Organization, 61(2). Springer Netherlands
We analyze clients’ contract choices in auctions where Dutch law firms compete for standard cases such as labor disputes for individuals and collecting debts for businesses. In the auctions, lawyers can submit bids with any fee arrangement they pre
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f094f49a36761f08244aafcf607a4630
https://dare.uva.nl/personal/pure/en/publications/the-pricing-structure-of-legal-services-do-lawyers-offer-what-clients-want(80897dc0-816b-4373-bfcd-eec36947ba3e).html
https://dare.uva.nl/personal/pure/en/publications/the-pricing-structure-of-legal-services-do-lawyers-offer-what-clients-want(80897dc0-816b-4373-bfcd-eec36947ba3e).html
Autor:
Sander Onderstal
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design. 24:39-63
In a field experiment, we study the revenue-generating properties of premium auctions. In a premium auction, the runner-up obtains a premium for driving up the price paid by the winner. Previous research, both theoretical and in the lab, has shown th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ba3943bd70759b256a3c73d2b7b6b3d0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00228-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00228-1
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e55870ae3af4de46f9da8fcb760d90a4
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4279170
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4279170
Publikováno v:
International Review of Law and Economics, 66:105981. Elsevier
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::08ff8c35130db7820d378954d24a5ae2
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2021.105981
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2021.105981
Autor:
Anouar El Haji, Sander Onderstal
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 28:670-686
In a laboratory experiment, we compare two auction mechanisms that determine the sequence of service to queued customers. In the server-initiated auction, the server, when idle, sells the right to be served next to the highest bidding customer in the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ca2c730bcd644da64b6a5a9503224d81
https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12314
https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12314
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In Akerlof's 1970 Market for Lemons, asymmetric information arises because sellers are better informed than buyers. A seller’s informational advantage creates an adverse selection problem. When buyers are better informed than sellers, a mirror-imag
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7804786a3cc3ef2cd0a0133b290bb2b5
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3903396
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3903396
Autor:
Sander Onderstal, Yang Yang
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In procurement auctions, bidders are usually better informed about technical, financial, or legal aspects of the goods and services procured. Therefore, the buyer may include a dialogue in the procurement procedure which enables the suppliers to reve
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6c2fd83c93b709f1381305e05fd3c75c
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3542737
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3542737
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that bi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0f5c5cea849e2e6ea315fb186a71a93b
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3323647
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3323647