Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 38
pro vyhledávání: '"Sam Baron"'
Publikováno v:
In Procedia Computer Science 2015 50:58-63
Autor:
SAM BARON
Publikováno v:
Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 8:278-299
A great deal has been written about ‘would’ counterfactuals of causal dependence. Comparatively little has been said regarding ‘would’ counterfactuals of ontological dependence. The standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics is inadequate for handlin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::09f0b5892387a4899b2c16accb14abbd
https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.39
https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.39
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 201
The Triviality Argument against presentism maintains that we should reject presentism because there is no way to define the view that is not either trivially true or obviously false. We suggest that this style of argument over-emphasises purely lingu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::258581a0fecdcfaf18e8fa7a4f361210
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03987-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03987-2
Autor:
Sam Baron, Baptiste Le Bihan
Publikováno v:
The Foundations of Spacetime Physics ISBN: 9781003219019
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9295a9250b025fd60164eb05518e7d6b
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003219019-9
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003219019-9
Autor:
Sam Baron
Publikováno v:
Australasian Philosophical Review. 5:221-226
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::088e35baf5c8aff70bc759d734758044
https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2021.2112019
https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2021.2112019
Autor:
Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 178:559-576
We argue that explanations appealing to logical impossibilities are genuine explanations. Our defense is based on a certain picture of impossibility. Namely, that there are impossibilities and that the impossibilities have structure. Assuming this br
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8b0601a5f1787f132036f75d0abd3ea8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01445-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01445-8
The first four chapters found that there are discoveries we could make that would lead people to deny that time exists. These discoveries could, however, be incompatible with what we know about the world from science. The goal of Part Two of the book
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::430d6ad8495f076e8f92738ec0ae95dc
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192864888.003.0005
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192864888.003.0005
In Chapter Seven, we consider a second line of argument for the claim that spacetime must emerge. This line of argument is based on the idea that without spacetime, empirical confirmation is not possible, and so we could never have any empirical basi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b0261d19d42191f46b40cf688f9e5332
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192864888.003.0007
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192864888.003.0007
The Sydney time studies aim to determine whether there is a univocal folk concept of time, and if there is, to determine at least some of the conditions that are necessary for that concept to be satisfied (if there are any such conditions). The metho
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b3e1526e3ab8ecd714700ccc4ec8561f
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192864888.003.0004
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192864888.003.0004