On Protecting SPHINCS+ Against Fault Attacks

Autor: Aymeric Genêt

Publikováno v: Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2023, Iss 2 (2023)

SPHINCS+ is a hash-based digital signature scheme that was selected by NIST in their post-quantum cryptography standardization process. The establishment of a universal forgery on the seminal scheme SPHINCS was shown to be feasible in practice by inj

Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/4d208025f79744cb992e94a569ce45ff

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Recovering the Tight Security Proof of SPHINCS+

Autor: Hülsing, Andreas, Kudinov, Mikhail, Agrawal, Shweta, Lin, Dongdai

Publikováno v: Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2022 ISBN: 9783031229718
Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2022: 28th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Taipei, Taiwan, December 5–9, 2022, Proceedings, Part IV, 3-33
STARTPAGE=3;ENDPAGE=33;TITLE=Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2022

In 2020, Kudinov, Kiktenko, and Fedorov pointed out a flaw in the tight security proof of the SPHINCS+ construction. This work gives a new tight security proof for SPHINCS+. The flaw can be traced back to the security proof for the Winternitz one-tim

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::643fe300132d3e41c7f9b39ad6f4d607
https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/28d0d5a0-bba6-4c6c-9649-94ff3f217c28

Evaluation of sodium pool fire and thermal consequence in two-cell configuration

Autor: Takashi TAKATA, Shuji OHNO, Yuji TAJIMA

Publikováno v: Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol 4, Iss 3, Pp 16-00577-16-00577 (2017)

Evaluation of accidental sodium leak, combustion, and its thermal consequence is one of the important issues to be assessed in the field of sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR). The present paper deals with the sodium pool fire and subsequent heat transf

Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/c6ea65094da94aec93566563e03d7dbf

The SPHINCS+ signature framework

Autor: Bernstein, D. J., Hülsing, A., Kölbl, S., Niederhagen, R., Rijneveld, J., Schwabe, P., Cavallaro, L.

Publikováno v: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Cavallaro, L. (ed.), CCS '19:Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, London, United Kingdom — November 11-15, 2019, pp. 2129-2146
Cavallaro, L. (ed.), CCS '19:Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, London, United Kingdom — November 11-15, 2019, 2129-2146. New York : ACM
STARTPAGE=2129;ENDPAGE=2146;TITLE=Cavallaro, L. (ed.), CCS '19:Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, London, United Kingdom — November 11-15, 2019
CCS
CCS 2019-Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2129-2146
STARTPAGE=2129;ENDPAGE=2146;TITLE=CCS 2019-Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

We introduce SPHINCS+, a stateless hash-based signature framework. SPHINCS+ has significant advantages over the state of the art in terms of speed, signature size, and security, and is among the nine remaining signature schemes in the second round of

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3401d79ac1dc1e10648cbd2ffb8a691d
https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363229