Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 51
pro vyhledávání: '"SGOURITSA, ALKMINI"'
Our work revisits the design of mechanisms via the learning-augmented framework. In this model, the algorithm is enhanced with imperfect (machine-learned) information concerning the input, usually referred to as prediction. The goal is to design algo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.14165
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX). The state-of-the-art results on the problem include that (e
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.12413
A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a central planner who can enforce how these systems are utilized, the users ca
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.04252
In a decentralized system with $m$ machines, we study the selfish scheduling problem where each user strategically chooses which machine to use. Each machine incurs a cost, which is a function of the total load assigned to it, and some cost-sharing m
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.01588
We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with $n$ agents. We focus on the model of resource-aware protocols, where the designer has prior access to
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2007.03751
Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general valuations. Envy-fr
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04596
Autor:
CHRISTODOULOU, GIORGOS1 gichristo@csd.auth.gr, SGOURITSA, ALKMINI2 alkmini@aueb.gr
Publikováno v:
SIAM Journal on Computing. 2024, Vol. 53 Issue 5, p1476-1523. 48p.
We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.01130
We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the inefficiency
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.07011
We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or players need
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1503.03392