Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 58
pro vyhledávání: '"Ruth Weintraub"'
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
Publikováno v:
Dialectica, Vol 75, Iss 1 (2021)
My aim in this paper is to explore some metaphysical and psychological implications of the (contentious) idealist interpretation of the belief in external objects ("bodies") Hume ascribes to us in the Treatise. More specifically, I will argue that th
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/37046f3b7ce3486793642841ce0fd8ff
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
Publikováno v:
Hume Studies. 48:117-141
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
Publikováno v:
Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 52:197-207
In this paper, I point to two problems engendered by two assumptions that Hume makes. The first is his nominalism: the view that all ideas are fully determinate with respect to all the aspects that are represented in them. The second, perhaps hithert
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
This paper is not concerned with the (amply discussed) question as to the rational response to peer disagreement. Instead, it addresses a (considerably less often debated) problem to which many views about the (epistemic) significance of disagreement
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5439939e8b021eecb85bf1e12cc5dca2
https://doi.org/10.32388/yi9dai
https://doi.org/10.32388/yi9dai
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Knowledge, Objects and Applications ISBN: 9783031216541
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ecf3e4dcb67a8c8f218dd9d15ba272f1
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21655-8_14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21655-8_14
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
Do we really know the things we think we know? Are any of our beliefs reasonable? Scepticism gives a pessimistic reply to these important epistemological questions - we don't know anything; none of our beliefs are reasonable. But can such a seemingly
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 177:1773-1790
Two kinds of considerations are thought to be relevant to the correct response to the discovery of a peer who disagrees with you about some question. The first is general principles pertaining to disagreement. According to the second kind of consider
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
Publikováno v:
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 9:1-20
In the “diminution argument,” which Hume adduces in the Treatise section “Scepticism with Regard to Reason,” he infers from our universal fallibility that “all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinctio
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
This book defends the very contentious Idealist interpretation of Hume on external objects, and draws from it far-reaching metaphysical and epistemological consequences for Hume's philosophy. Its interest is both interpretive and analytic. The conten
Autor:
Ruth Weintraub
Publikováno v:
Inquiry. 63:795-811
In this paper, I defend a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement, the question as to how you should respond when you learn that your ‘epistemic peer’ disagrees with you about some issue (...