Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 32
pro vyhledávání: '"Ruth Groff"'
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Publikováno v:
Journal of Social Ontology, Vol 1, Iss 2 (2015)
I argue that critical realists think pretty much what Tukka Kaidesoja says that he himself thinks, but also that Kaidesoja’s objections to the views that he attributes to critical realists are not persuasive.
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/bf798094b7374bedae421e570f9b59db
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Subject & Object is a thematic collection of classic works by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse, designed to foreground the authors'philosophical concerns, especially in the areas of epistemology, ontology, and method. The volume, w
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Groff defends'realism about causality'through close discussions of Kant, Hilary Putnam, Brian Ellis and Charles Taylor, among others. In so doing she affirms critical realism, but with several important qualifications. In particular, she rejects the
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Publikováno v:
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 51:675-688
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a13b6fc55d2379fa34a88ee6f8448285
https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12320
https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12320
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 199:9881-9896
Talk of powers is muddled. Building upon (Groff, in: R. Groff & J. Greco (eds) Powers and capacities in philosophy: The new aristotelianism, Routledge, London, 2012a, pp 207–227), I disambiguate four senses of the term: powers construed as activity
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0dc1abf0b179ff2c0507eae197441e6e
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03229-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03229-x
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Publikováno v:
Synthese Library ISBN: 9783030287214
Assuming a neo-Aristotelian anti-passivist metaphysics, I pose the question “Is it powerful things that produce outcomes, or the powers of powerful things?” I argue that it is powerful things, not the properties thereof, that ‘do the doing.’
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::aeaeb6846a05bda90db99f2c25ac1243
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28722-1_3
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28722-1_3
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Publikováno v:
Journal of Critical Realism. 15:409-418
In this lecture I argue that it is not possible for social scientists or others engaged in making causal claims about the world to be neutral with respect to the question of what causation is. One need not be in possession of a full-blown account, bu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a69158158f8810485819f078c695c500
https://doi.org/10.1080/14767430.2016.1190909
https://doi.org/10.1080/14767430.2016.1190909
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 196:179-200
I argue that realism about causal powers (which, loosely following Brian Ellis, I refer to as ‘anti-passivism’) sublates the passivist, Humean-inflected free will problematic. In the first part of the paper I show that adopting what I call ‘pow
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2577cb836757cffc0924ddcd73b7256f
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1124-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1124-y
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Publikováno v:
Journal of Critical Realism. 13:422-442
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d1647ed55165c12a0350e19db3358924
https://doi.org/10.1179/1476743014z.00000000037
https://doi.org/10.1179/1476743014z.00000000037
Autor:
Ruth Groff
Publikováno v:
Philosophy & Social Criticism. 38:775-792
I argue that Aristotelians who are sympathetic to the critique of liberal moral categories put forward by Alasdair MacIntyre ought to avail themselves of Marx's analysis of capitalism in Capital, Volume 1. Broadly speaking, there are two reasons for
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6acccd6890732c5379b5414776d513a4
https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453712453288
https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453712453288