Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 61
pro vyhledávání: '"Ruqu Wang"'
Autor:
Huasheng Song1 songzju@zju.edu.cn, Ruqu Wang2 wangr@queensu.ca, Jianliang Ye1 jianliangye@zju.edu.cn
Publikováno v:
Annals of Economics & Finance. Nov2019, Vol. 20 Issue 2, p525-540. 16p.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 175:291-317
In this paper, we analyze the role of negative prizes in contest design with a fixed budget, risk-neutral contestants, and independent private abilities. The effort-maximizing prize allocation rule features a threshold. When the highest effort is abo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dfa2fc14f9243e83057fcf0279d98465
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.016
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.016
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 124:99-119
We investigate how the initial distribution of scarce human resources determines the equilibrium industry structure. Using a two-firm competition model with resource-dependent production technology, we examine the flow of these resources in gradual t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::07cddb092842bfad70f36d8814c069c0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0566-0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0566-0
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 170:168-170
In this paper, we analyze a spatial Bertrand oligopoly model called network-city model. Firms compete directly and simultaneously with all other firms. In the model, we allow for heterogeneous product differentiation, heterogeneous constant marginal
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::93e8f4c9badc82774f5b63b10ab93409
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.023
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 99:224-238
Will generous return policies in auctions benefit bidders? We investigate this issue using second-price common-value auctions. Theoretically, we find that the symmetric bidding equilibrium is unique unless returns are free, and when returns are free
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0814d1a05fd88b200d2f8a51440e4d86
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.002
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics Letters. :1219-1229
In this paper we propose a “behavioral equilibrium” definition for a class of dynamic games of perfect information. We document various experimental studies of the Centipede Game in the literature that demonstrate that players rarely follow the s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e450bfd5b2d7b8d5ce04a9a4779c4cd7
https://doi.org/10.4236/tel.2016.66115
https://doi.org/10.4236/tel.2016.66115
Publikováno v:
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 18
In this paper, we investigate how limited liability affects firms’ bidding behavior in license auctions. We focus on a model where firms first seek financing from banks, then bid for the licenses, and the winning firms set prices in a product marke
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c2c32c76e4805682468f966f0f6685d9
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0152
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0152
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 2010, Vol. 39 Issue 1/2, p273-299. 27p. 1 Chart.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 148:2096-2123
In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargainin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9702099c4e44a64b8eeb884a1038ffc7
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.013
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.013
Autor:
Yongmin Chen1 yongmin.chen@colorado.edu, Ruqu Wang2 wangr@qed.econ.queensu.ca
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 1999, Vol. 14 Issue 2, p417-428. 12p.