Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 22
pro vyhledávání: '"Rupert Freeman"'
Publikováno v:
Management Science, 63 (3)
We initiate the study of incentive-compatible forecasting competitions in which multiple forecasters make predictions about one or more events and compete for a single prize. We have two objectives: (1) to incentivize forecasters to report truthfully
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6ea10490226f3f380afeed3437281483
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/559971
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/559971
Publikováno v:
Operations Research.
Consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations, where monetary payments are not allowed. When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve compelling notions of fairness such as EV, which states that
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::62de73bbe14343689f8b36be6ba246c3
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2432
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2432
Autor:
Dana Popescu, Rupert Freeman
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8595840e10555413648e7bb918d5804d
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4432794
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4432794
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
We consider the allocation of homogeneous divisible goods to agents with linear additive valuations. Our focus is on the case where some agents are secretive and reveal no preference information, while the remaining agents reveal full preference info
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e084dfb17f9608af56c76257a0147a31
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/39
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/39
Publikováno v:
IJCAI
We introduce a new model for two-sided matching which allows us to borrow popular fairness notions from the fair division literature such as envy-freeness up to one good and maximin share guarantee. In our model, each agent is matched to multiple age
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::800e8d015272aac98acca59f97ce68a3
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/29
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/29
We introduce a new fairness criterion, order symmetry, for assignment mechanisms that match n objects to n agents with ordinal preferences over the objects. An assignment mechanism is order symmetric with respect to some probability measure over pref
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5387ab5ef8c0ded6d84bc08770e2bfbc
https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/xt37c
https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/xt37c
Publikováno v:
AAAI
We draw a surprising and direct mathematical equivalence between the class of allocation mechanisms for divisible goods studied in the context of fair division and the class of weakly budget-balanced wagering mechanisms designed for eliciting probabi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d431a7ee19655189e6b789ce29a4a665
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011957
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011957
Publikováno v:
AAAI
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a collection of indivisible goods among a set of players. Much of the existing literature on fair division focuses on notions of individual fairness. For instance, envy-freeness requires that no player prefe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::51b21f3e234355062062b28865c39c9c
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011853
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011853
Autor:
Rupert Freeman, Nicholas Mattei
This book constitutes the conference proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2024, held in New Brunswick, NJ, USA, during October 14-16, 2024. The 18 full papers and 8 one-page abstracts presented were care
Publikováno v:
IJCAI
We study proportionality in approval-based multiwinner elections with a variable number of winners, where both the size and identity of the winning committee are informed by voters' opinions. While proportionality has been studied in multiwinner elec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9741d4a3902287fc95c8187550802330
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/19
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/19