Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 91
pro vyhledávání: '"Rowat, Colin"'
Sophisticated machine learning (ML) models to inform trading in the financial sector create problems of interpretability and risk management. Seemingly robust forecasting models may behave erroneously in out of distribution settings. In 2020, some of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2109.15112
The Shapley value is one of the most widely used measures of feature importance partly as it measures a feature's average effect on a model's prediction. We introduce joint Shapley values, which directly extend Shapley's axioms and intuitions: joint
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2107.11357
Explaining AI systems is fundamental both to the development of high performing models and to the trust placed in them by their users. The Shapley framework for explainability has strength in its general applicability combined with its precise, rigor
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1910.06358
Autor:
Kerber, Manfred1 (AUTHOR), Rowat, Colin2 (AUTHOR) c.rowat@bham.ac.uk, Yoshihara, Naoki3,4,5 (AUTHOR)
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. Dec2023, Vol. 52 Issue 4, p1009-1035. 27p.
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Economics 66, pp. 26-39. Elsevier, October 2016
Mechanized reasoning uses computers to verify proofs and to help discover new theorems. Computer scientists have applied mechanized reasoning to economic problems but -- to date -- this work has not yet been properly presented in economics journals.
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.02478
We present an original theorem in auction theory: it specifies general conditions under which the sum of the payments of all bidders is necessarily not identically zero, and more generally not constant. Moreover, it explicitly supplies a construction
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.0542
When faced with the question of how to represent properties in a formal proof system any user has to make design decisions. We have proved three of the theorems from Maskin's 2004 survey article on Auction Theory using the Isabelle/HOL system, and we
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.0774
Using mechanised reasoning we prove that combinatorial Vickrey auctions are soundly specified in that they associate a unique outcome (allocation and transfers) to any valid input (bids). Having done so, we auto-generate verified executable code from
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.1779
Autor:
Lange, Christoph, Caminati, Marco B., Kerber, Manfred, Mossakowski, Till, Rowat, Colin, Wenzel, Makarius, Windsteiger, Wolfgang
Novel auction schemes are constantly being designed. Their design has significant consequences for the allocation of goods and the revenues generated. But how to tell whether a new design has the desired properties, such as efficiency, i.e. allocatin
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.4193